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The dissertation comprises three independent but thematically-related ap-
plications of game and contract theory to small business ﬁnancing. Chapter 1
(Spousal Guarantees) explains the determinants of small business debt ﬁnanc-
ing and collateral choice within an incomplete ﬁnancial contracting framework.
Personal assets generally involve shared ownership and hence intra-familial bar-
gaining before they can be used as a security. On their face their use should be
dominated by the use of business assets. Data show that about 10% of loans
are nonetheless secured with a personal asset. It is shown that the determinants
of small business collateralized asset choice depend on both ﬁrm characteristics
and owner/family characteristics. The likelihood of the use of a personal asset
as collateral is decreasing both in ﬁrm default risk and in ﬁrm size. Chapter
2 (Guarantees versus Collateral in Small Business Debt Financing) develops a
model of committed debt choice within an optimal incomplete contracting envi-
ronment. Owners of small businesses are invariably required by banks personally
to commit to any loans made to the business. Commitments are either collateral
xior guarantees. Both types of commitment get around the legal protection of lim-
ited liability, but collateralized loans are not subject to state-based homestead
exemptions. The likelihood of the use of a committed loan is increasing in ﬁrm
default-risk and decreasing in ﬁrm size, characteristics consistent with available
empirical evidence. The model also explains a non-monotonicity at the 80-90%
level in the variation of interest rates to diﬀerences in homestead exemption lev-
els. Finally, emerging empirical evidence shows that the change in divorce laws
in the 1970s improved the welfare of women within marriage. Chapter 3 (Mar-
ital Investments and Changing Divorce Laws) uses a ﬁnite two stage game in
which team-members ﬁrst vote (non-cooperatively) to invest and then vote to
remain in the relationship. The model trades-oﬀ the beneﬁts of making marital
investments against the dis-amenity of remaining in a relationship with the wrong
person. The unique separating equilibrium is shown to be superior under no-fault
divorce compared to fault divorce under both types of marital property regimes




This paper explains the determinants of collateralized asset-choice in small busi-
ness debt ﬁnancing. Data show (the NSSBF) that the majority of small business
debt is bank-sourced; it is overwhelmingly backed by collateral; and the asset
used as collateral is overwhelmingly sourced from the business.1 Nonetheless, the
data also show that about 10 percent of collateralized loans are backed instead by
a personal asset such as a family home.2 What is interesting about such a choice
of asset as collateral is that it is an asset that usually involves shared ownership,
so that the consent of the co-owner is often required. Concrete examples of people
likely to be asked to act as third-party guarantees include wives guaranteeing the
loans of husbands (and vice-versa), parents the loans of children, grandparents
the loans of grandchildren.3 On its face therefore using a co-owned asset is a
1The importance of commitments to making loan funds available to small businesses has
been shown in Avery et al. (1998) using 1987 and 1993 data on small business ﬁnancing: debts
without the backing of either guarantees and/or collateral never comprise more than 15% of all
small business loans.
2See subsection 1.4.1 of this paper for the evidence.
3During the 1990s common law courts in the Anglosphere were asked increasingly to re-
examine the legality of such guarantees, owing to concern about the possibility that such guar-
antees might be signed under ‘moral suasion’ or emotional and physical ‘coercion’, as well as to
concern about the disproportionate impact of the potential loss of a family home on guarantors
1higher transaction cost loan contract and so an interesting question is: why isn’t
its use dominated by the use of a business asset? Why do we see it used in the
data at all?
The paper utilizes an ‘incomplete ﬁnancial contracting’ model to fully char-
acterize the determinants of collateralized asset choice in small business debt
ﬁnance. I show that the choice of collateralized asset depends on two sets of
characteristics: one set dealing with ﬁrm attributes (and in particular the two
important ones of ﬁrm default risk and ﬁrm growth potential), and the other set
of characteristics dealing with family attributes (such as relationship closeness
and intrafamilial bargaining power). With this framework I show the following
fundamental result: the likelihood of a personal asset being used to back a small
business debt is decreasing both in ﬁrm growth potential and in ﬁrm default risk.
We know empirically that compared to the universe of all small business loans
the subset of collateralized loans are on average higher risk. That logic is not
exacerbated with respect to the use of personal assets – they are used as back-
ing only for ﬁrms that are solid (low risk of default) but not spectacular (steady
growth).
This result is driven by the fundamental trade-oﬀ arising out of the optimal
collateralized loan contract: the ex post cost of liquidating – after default – the
chosen asset backing the loan versus the ex ante eﬃciency of enabling otherwise
credit rationed ﬁrms with viable investment projects to be funded. When the risk
of ﬁrm default is high, the contract design problem focuses more on the possible ex
post waste of asset-liquidation. Asset liquidation is (ex post) ineﬃcient because,
in the case of the business asset, it is more productive to leave it in the hands of
the owner, who has inside knowledge and specialist expertise; and in the case of a
such as non-working wives and grandparents.
2family home, it provides a ﬂow of services to its occupants which is not represented
by its ﬁre-sale market price. Since an assumption of the model is that it is more
ineﬃcient to liquidate a family home rather than business assets, it follows that
for high risk ﬁrms it is better to use business assets to secure the loan. For low risk
ﬁrms the contractual design problem switches to the ex ante concern of freeing
funds for viable projects, and the problem of providing the business owner with
the right incentives not to renegotiate the loan when business is good. In that
case the greater threat-value of an asset with higher ex post waste of liquidation
becomes beneﬁcial from the ex ante perspective, so that the personal asset is in
general preferred. However, this preference depends also on the attributes of the
ex post renegotiation which follows default for good ﬁrms – each asset brings with
it a diﬀerent renegotiation dynamic. In particular, with respect to the use of a
personal asset, since strangers do not guarantee each other’s debts, it is intrinsic
to such loan contracts that they involve some sort of relationship between the
co-signer and the beneﬁciary of that guarantee (the business owner). The loan
contract can ‘free ride’ on the pre-existing ‘relational contract’ between them,
and so it is possible that, depending on the characteristics of the relationship (its
‘closeness’ and the business owner’s intra-familial bargaining power), that even
for low risk ﬁrms the business asset might still be preferred after all.
The economic signiﬁcance of small businesses Small businesses ac-
count for half of private-sector output, employ more than half of private-sector
workers, and provide about three-fourths of net new jobs each year.4 Their sus-
ceptibility to ﬂuctuations in bank lending practices is an important transmission
4See U.S. Small Business Administration, Oﬃce of Advocacy, 1998 State of Small Business,
chapter 2 (http://www.sba.gov/advo/statsa/).
3mechanism of monetary policy, and it is known that they are much more aﬀected
than larger ﬁrms by business cycle-related ﬂuctuations.5 On-the-ground circum-
stances have been changing rapidly in the small business sector, with the rise in
the 90s of private, outside equity and debt markets, and in particular, the rise
in certain industry sectors of venture capital ﬁnancing and more developed IPO
markets enlivening scholarly interest in the interface between the private and pub-
lic corporate spheres and how ﬁrms transition between the two. The historically
impressive economic boom of the 90s was driven by the entrepreneurial dynamics
of small business corporate form: some of today’s small businesses are the giants
of tomorrow. On the other hand, the turn-over rate of small businesses is high.
Relationship to literature The paper contributes to that recent litera-
ture which analyzes ﬁnancial decisions from the ‘incomplete contracting’ per-
spective inaugurated by Grossman and Hart (1986) and applied to the ﬁnancial
contracting setting by Aghion and Bolton (1992), Hart and Moore (1994) and
Hart and Moore (1998). For a summary of the standard framework and related
literature see chapter 5 of Hart (1995). The model is closest to that of Bolton
and Scharfstein (1990) (though that paper is concerned with predation in in-
dustrial organization theory). Papers (like this one) extending this literature to
include more than one investor are Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), Dewatripont
and Maskin (1995), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Bergl¨ of and von Thadden
(1994). The ﬁrst two involve multiple investors with the same asset claim while
the second two explore the eﬀects of having diﬀerent investors hold diﬀerent asset
claims. A related, earlier theoretical literature modelling debt contracts as aris-
ing from the asymmetric information that exists between the lender and lendee
5See Gertler and Gilchrist (1994).
4and which therefore necessitates costly monitoring by the former includes (for
the one period case) Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985), as well as
(for the multiperiod case) Gale and Hellwig (1989). A paper similar to this one
in that it analyzes the role of collateral in renegotiation is Bester (1994), though
it does so in an asymmetric information framework rather than the incomplete
contracting framework utilized here. We are only aware of one empirical paper
on the use of collateral and secured guarantees in small business ﬁnance, namely,
Avery et al. (1998). There do not appear to be any papers (either theoretical or
empirical) dealing with third party guarantees per se, though there has been some
discussion of this in the legal literature (see generally Fehlberg (1997)). There
is no theoretical literature in economics modelling marriages and like emotion-
dependent relationships as a ‘relational contract’, though Scott and Scott (1998)
is a description in such terms within the legal literature.
Outline of paper Section 1.2 outlines the model while section 1.3 solves
for the optimal contract and discusses the policy diﬃculties associated with third
party guarantees. Section 1.4 explores the determinants of the pattern of collat-
eralized small business loan ﬁnance while section 1.5 examines the case where the
startup ﬁrm is predominantly constituted by entrepreneurial human capital, so
that there might not be suﬃcient business assets to use as collateral. Section 1.6
concludes with directions for future research.
51.2 Model
1.2.1 The ex ante contract
The agents At date 0 a bank (denoted B), an entrepreneur (denoted E) and
a guarantor (denoted G) convene to sign a guaranteed loan contract to enable
the entrepreneur to invest in a long-term, potentially proﬁtable project.6 The
entrepreneur must borrow funds because he is wealth-constrained; in particular,
we assume that he has zero (liquid) wealth ex ante, and we assume the same for
the guarantor. All agents are risk neutral and discount factors are normalized to
zero.
The project The project lasts two periods. There is no intertemporal in-
terest rate. The project provides non-negative returns of ˜ R1 (a random variable
with support {0,x}) at date 1 and R2 = r at date 2. In the ﬁrst instance these






0 with probability 1 − θ,
x with probability θ.
The project’s initial cost is K > 0. The project is ex ante viable or productive
since θx + r > K, where we also assume that K < x. Thus, we have biased
6Hereafter the entrepreneur is referred to generically as ‘he’ and the guarantor as ‘she’.
7These returns are speciﬁc to the entrepreneur - that is, neither the bank nor the guarantor
can obtain these returns from the project without the entrepreneur. However, we do not model
the process by which the entrepreneur generates these returns, assuming instead that they are
exogenously given.
8Note that there is no loss of generality in conﬁning attention to a two-state date 1 return,
since even if R1 is an interval (in R+) it would be easy to show that it would never be optimal
for the entrepreneur to make a partial payment, so that default in that more general case would
be deﬁned as not paying anything at date 1.
6the spousal guarantee problem in favor of ﬁnancing indubitably worthwhile in-
vestments. The amounts R1 and r are uncontractable between entrepreneur and
bank: that is, ex ante describable but ex post unenforceable (or ‘observable’ but
not ‘veriﬁable’ in the language of Grossman and Hart (1986)).
The loan The entrepreneur borrows K from the bank at date 0 for a promise
to repay P at date 1. The promised repayment amount P is also uncontractable.
One way to think about this in concrete terms is to imagine the existence of
a ‘savings account’ belonging to the entrepreneur into which the return is de-
posited when it accrues. Any amount in this ‘savings account’ is untouchable by
the bank, even in the event that the entrepreneur defaults on the repayment of
P. This is the ‘diversion’ or ‘stealing’ assumption of Hart and Moore (1998), a
possibly extreme but nonetheless useful assumption designed to capture the more
realistic phenomenon of managerial discretion in the use and disbursement of cor-
porate funds. At least within the context of family businesses a reason for such
untouchability lies in the ability of entrepreneurs potentially to divert business
proﬁts into family gifts and trusts.
Because the date 1 return is describable, the date 0 contract can stipulate
the date 1 payment P to be conditional on ˜ R1. Thus the contract can stipulate
that at date 1 the entrepreneur should repay P0 when R1 = 0 and Px when
R1 = x. However, because any contract terms conditioned on ˜ R1 are ex post
unenforceable, we need to denote the actual payment made by the entrepreneur
at date 1 by ˆ P. Without loss we restrict this date 1 action set to be the same
as the date 0 contractually speciﬁed repayment schedule: ˆ P ∈ {P0,Px}. Actual
date 1 repayment is contractible.
7Security asset Because of the noncontractibility of the return stream, the
bank requires security for the loaned funds K. There exist two types of asset
which might act as security. A security on the assets (either or both) is con-
tractible.
The ﬁrst asset (asset A) is a business asset that will be bought with the bor-
rowed funds. It lasts one period. This asset is essential to the production process:
in combination with the entrepreneur’s skill it produces the return stream over
the two periods. If the asset is liquidated at date 1, then the entrepreneur is
unable to earn the date 2 return r. The date 1 liquidation value to the bank is
LA = αr, where α ∈ [0,1).
The second asset (asset H) is a shared non-liquid relationship asset which is
completely independent of the business. It has a deterministic market value of
z, which can be interpreted as the value of (say) a family home to its occupants.
The date 1 liquidation value to the bank is LH = λz, where λ ∈ [0,1). This
modelling assumption captures the fact that the relationship asset is worth more
when maintained as a relationship asset than when in the possession of the bank.
Speciﬁcally, it captures the fact that a relationship asset like a family home
provides a value to its occupants not encapsulated in liquidated sale price alone.
Note that when both assets are used as security, the date 1 liquidation value of
the assets AH to the bank is LAH = αr+λz. These liquidation values constitute
ex post exogenously determined ineﬃciencies which play an important role in the
ex post renegotiation to be described below.
A security can also be placed over the combined assets, which we denote AH.
8Relationship closeness Although the interpretation given of the parame-
ter λ is that it represents the ineﬃciency of having the relationship asset liqui-
dated by the bank rather than remaining in the hands of the owners, an alterna-
tive, related, interpretation is that λ represents the ‘closeness’ of the relationship.
In this interpretation the magnitude of λ is inversely related to relationship close-
ness: the lower is λ, the more close the relationship between E and G; the higher
is λ, the less close the relationship.
Relationship asset share At date 2 (when the model ends) the relation-
ship asset is sold and consumed by the entrepreneur and/or guarantor according
to their exogenously determined share of the asset. Let SE ∈ [0,1] denote the
entrepreneur’s date 2 share of the relationship asset (or the date 2 sale proceeds
thereof). Hence the guarantor’s share is (1 − SE). When SE = 1 we have a pure
personal guarantee, and when SE = 0 we have a pure third party guarantee. The
most common case of using the matrimonial home as collateral will (depending on
the family law property regime in place) fall between these two extremes, though
the most usual family law default rule is SE = 1/2.
Entrepreneur’s promised payment to guarantor The guarantor must
be compensated for the risk of permitting (her share of) the relationship asset to
act as security for the loan. We denote by y0 and yx the amounts the entrepreneur
promises to pay the guarantor at date 2 (conditional on the entrepreneur’s date 1
actual repayment ˆ P) in return for her permitting the relationship asset to be uti-
lized as security. Note that the y’s need not be interpreted as an explicit payment
arising out of the guarantee contract but can be interpreted more expansively as
the promise of a ‘standard of living’ arising out of the relationship. The y’s are
9enforceable since they are conditioned on actual date 1 repayment by the en-
trepreneur.9 Such enforcement can be interpreted as divorce law in the case of
spousal guarantees. We consider the interpretation of this repayment further in
subsection 1.2.2 when we outline the ex post renegotiation regime.
Contractual provision for default We will assume that the assets are
discrete so that they cannot be partially liquidated. In the case of a family home
at least this assumption is realistic. The most general type of default provision
then speciﬁes that when the entrepreneur makes a date 1 payment ˆ P, the bank has
the right to liquidate the secured asset(s) with probability β( ˆ P) ≤ 1.10 The date
0 contract will therefore specify that when the entrepreneur makes the payment
Px the bank has the right to liquidate the secured asset with probability βx,
and when the entrepreneur makes the repayment P0 the bank has the right to
liquidate the secured asset with probability β0. The β’s are enforceable since they
are conditioned on actual date 1 repayment by the entrepreneur.
Payoﬀs Payoﬀs for the agents are described in the next section when the
optimal guarantee is solved. They are linear in income/payments and (for the
entrepreneur and guarantor) linear in asset share and (for the bank) linear in
expected foreclosure value.
9Nothing in the model precludes the payments to the guarantor being conditioned also on
the foreclosure probabilities, which would then give four possible repayments rather than the
two assumed here. However, since the results of the model do not depend upon this point, the
simpler modelling choice has been adopted.
10A model of this type was ﬁrst used in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990).
10Contractibility It is useful to summarize the contractibility assumptions
in the model. The return stream and agent payoﬀs are not contractible, while the
asset(s) and the entrepreneur’s actual date 1 payments are contractible. Anything
conditional on a non-contractible variable is non-contractible. These contractibil-
ity assumptions rest on the idea that it is easier to divert cash ﬂow than physical,
non-liquid assets, a distinction emphasized in Hart and Moore (1998).
The date 0 contract We assume that the entrepreneur has all the ex ante
bargaining power and chooses the date 0 contract Γ = {P0,Px,β0,βx,y0,yx}. The
ﬁrst two terms (conditioned on ˜ R1) are not enforceable but the remaining terms
(conditioned on ˆ P) are enforceable. Since the ﬁrst two terms are not enforceable,
at date 1 the entrepreneur might choose to ‘deviate’ from the loan repayment
amounts speciﬁed in Γ.
The timeline is as follows. First nature moves determining whether the date
1 return is either x or 0. Then the entrepreneur decides whether to pay Px or P0.
Depending on this repayment amount, the bank acquires the right to foreclose
on the secured asset(s) with probability βx or β0. However, liquidation of the
secured asset(s) is not automatic because such liquidation is ex post ineﬃcient.
The agents would prefer to renegotiate the ex ante contractual terms βx and β0,
setting them to zero and dividing amongst themselves the ex post surplus thereby
saved. If renegotiation succeeds then the secured asset(s) is not liquidated and if
it fails then it is liquidated by the bank. The speciﬁcs of renegotiation is outlined
in subsection 1.2.2. This timeline is depicted in ﬁgure 1.1 below.
First-best If a comprehensive contract could be signed, then given the as-
sumptions on the productivity of the project the entrepreneur would have no dif-
11Figure 1.1: Timeline of Model
ﬁculty getting a bank to ﬁnance the project, and the ﬁrst-best would be achieved.
Note therefore that securing the loan would not be necessary and, if nonetheless
undertaken, liquidation would never be part of a ﬁrst-best outcome. However,
the inability to contract on the return stream means that, without a mechanism
to enforce date 1 repayment, no bank will lend to the entrepreneur in spite of the
overall viability of the project. The usual mechanism in the literature is a security
over the project asset A that is bought with the borrowed funds. Since the en-
trepreneur values continuance of the project, the possibility of liquidation of A at
date 1 gives the bank leverage over the entrepreneur ensuring that the latter pays
the loan out of the date 1 return stream. Securing the relationship asset rather
than the project asset switches the leverage problem from the bank/entrepreneur
12relationship to the entrepreneur/guarantor relationship. This is further explained
in the following subsection.
1.2.2 The ex post renegotiation
Renegotiation mechanism Renegotiation takes the form of the entrepreneur
bribing the bank not to exercise its right to liquidate the foreclosed asset(s). Since
the entrepreneur has zero ex ante (liquid) wealth, such a bribe is only possible in
the case R1 = x. If the payment of P0 is called a default, then default can either
be strategic or necessary according to whether it occurred when R1 equalled x
or 0 respectively. Consequently there can be no renegotiation after a necessary
default while after a strategic default renegotiation is possible since the funds
potentially exist to ‘buy back’ the seized asset(s).
The ex post surplus over which the agents renegotiate depends on which
asset(s) is used as security. The three diﬀerent models examined in this paper
are denoted A, H or AH, depending on whether the security is over the project
asset, the relationship asset, or both. To consolidate notation in the paper, deﬁne
the indicator functions κi
r and κi







1 when i = AH, A








1 when i = AH,H
0 when i = A
Denote by Πi the social surplus salvaged by the parties when the liquidation
of asset i is forestalled via renegotiation. These diﬀerent amounts can then be
expressed as Πi = κi
rr(1 − α) + κi
zz(1 − λ). Note that they depend on the
13exogenously given liquidation values mentioned in the previous subsection, so
that the ex post surplus is also exogenous. Those liquidation values can also be
succinctly summarized using indicator functions as Li = κi
rαr + κi
zλz.
It is known empirically (see Dennis et al (1988)) that banks rarely forgive
principal in the event of default, and so we assume that the bank is exactly
compensated for the loss of liquidation value which it gives up. The entrepreneur
and guarantor then engage in two-way bargaining over the surplus that remains.
The agents are exogenously endowed with ex post bargaining power τE for the
entrepreneur and τG for the guarantor. These bargaining parameters sum to one.
The details of the generalized Nash bargaining are presented in Appendix A and
the results summarized by gi
E = τE[κi
rr(1 − 2α) + κi
zz(1 − 2λ)].
It is worth pointing out that since the relationship asset H is assumed con-
tractible and since it becomes liquid at date 2, the model leaves open the ability
of the entrepreneur to propose at date 1 (say in exchange for forbearance on
the part of the bank in foreclosing on the project asset A) a share of his date 2
relationship asset proceeds. In some family law/property law jurisdictions such
a contract would not be allowed, but this is not true for all. Allowing such an
additional mechanism of ex ante commitment would introduce a ‘constant re-
contracting’ style of security over H.11 For convenience we rule this out, just as
we rule it out for the side payments between entrepreneur and guarantor (which
would not be permitted anyway under most family law regimes).
11See Hart and Moore (1998) or Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989) (the latter examining default and
renegotiation in the context of international lending and sovereign debt) for examples of models
which do not rule out constant recontracting.
14Leverage In a one-period model the results are clear: the guarantor does
not sign and the bank does not lend. In the two-period model, and in the ab-
sence of an outside asset, the bank only lends because it has leverage over the
entrepreneur at date 1 (the time at which repayment to the bank is due). That
leverage consists in the ability of the bank to withdraw from the entrepreneur’s
use the inside asset, so depriving the entrepreneur of the chance to earn the date
2 income r. When the outside rather than the inside asset is used as security, this
leverage then switches to that between guarantor and entrepreneur, and now lies
in the contractual payments y from the entrepreneur to the guarantor as well as in
the extent to which the entrepreneur values the relationship asset as determined
by exogenous ownership share.
1.3 The optimal collateralized loan contract
In this section we set out the optimization program that the entrepreneur solves at
date 0 and use it to characterize the optimal contract for each of the three possible
cases of secured asset (A,H,AH). Without loss, we focus on the renegotiation-
proof contract, where the possibility of future renegotiation is anticipated by the
parties at date 0. Renegotiation-proofness manifests itself in the optimization
program in the form of an added constraint.
Set-up At date 0 the entrepreneur solves the following linear program (call
it (F(i))), choosing over Γi = {P0,Px,β0,βx,y0,yx} to maximize his expected
15payoﬀ12
θ[x − Px − yx + (1 − βxκ
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+ (1 − θ)[−P0 − y0 + (1 − β0κ
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subject to the individual rationality constraint of the bank
θ[Px + βxL
i] + (1 − θ)[P0 + β0L
i] ≥ K (1.2)
as well as to the individual rationality constraint of the guarantor






+ (1 − θ)[y0 + (1 − β0κ
i
z)(1 − S
E)z] ≥ (1 − S
E)z
and, in order to ensure that the entrepreneur does not strategically default when
R1 = x, subject also to the following ‘renegotiation constraint’
x − Px − yx + (1 − βxκ
i






≥ x − P0 − y0 + (1 − β0κ
i






and subject to the following ‘limited liability’ constraints for the entrepreneur
and guarantor owing to the assumption of ex ante zero liquid wealth
P0 ≤ 0 and Px ≤ x (1.5)
0 ≤ y0 ≤ r and 0 ≤ yx ≤ x + r − Px (1.6)
Note that these two constraints incorporate the ‘no constant recontracting’ as-
sumptions made in the previous sections. Finally we have the feasibility con-
straints on the foreclosure probabilities
0 ≤ β0,βx ≤ 1 (1.7)
12Note that each of these contractual terms should also have an i superscript, but to avoid
notational clutter we omit them.
16The program depicts three models nested in one, depending on which asset is
used as security (A,H,AH). The payoﬀs of each of the three agents are written
assuming that the contractual terms of Γi are honored. Thus, equation (1.1)
shows the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ for both the case where R1 = x and he pays the
bank Px (and the guarantor yx) and for the case where R1 = 0 and he pays the
bank P0 (and the guarantor y0). When Px is paid then with probability 1−βx the
entrepreneur keeps the secured asset(s) while with probability βx he needs to buy
it back and then split the surplus with the guarantor, giving him gi
E. The payoﬀs
for the bank and guarantor are derived in analogous way. Regarding equation
(1.4), the LHS is taken from the LHS of (1.1) while the RHS has the same form
except that now the entrepreneur has paid P0 so the other contractual terms (β
and y) conform to that payment. The second renegotiation constraint, ensuring
that the entrepreneur pays Px instead of P0 when R1 = 0, is not needed since
the entrepreneur is wealth constrained. For the same reason we need not include
renegotiation payoﬀs for either the entrepreneur or the guarantor for the case
when R1 = 0 since they are automatically zero.
Characterizing the optimal contract The following proposition will help
to solve for the optimal contract.
Proposition 1 (Contract Characterization). In the optimal contract
(i) P0 = 0,
(ii) y0 = y0(1 − κi
r) ≥ 0,
(iii) βx = 0,
(iv) both the bank’s and guarantor’s individual rationality constraints bind,
17(v) the renegotiation constraint binds.
Proof See Appendix B.
The proof of (i) follows immediately from assumptions on the contracting
technology made in subsection 1.2.1.
Part (ii) shows that the corner solution for the payment to the guarantor is
model-dependent. When only asset H is used, sale of H after necessary default
still leaves the entrepreneur with asset A and the date 2 return. To ensure that
the entrepreneur takes seriously the loss of the relationship asset when consid-
ering strategic default, the contract makes him hand the entirety of this future
return to the guarantor. Indeed without such a stipulation, the guarantor would
not participate in the contract. Note that in this part of the proof we have
used the assumption that the date 2 return, while non-contractible between the
entrepreneur and bank, is contractible between the entrepreneur and guarantor.
This assumption can be justiﬁed as a modelling short-hand for the fact that third-
party guarantees are signed within the context of a larger (long-term, relational)
contract obtaining between the entrepreneur and guarantor.13 It is known from
the theory of relational contracting that a long-term relationship can transform
non-contractible variables into de facto contractible ones. An alternative justi-
ﬁcation is that the institution of family law, in particular, laws governing the
dissolution of marriages (which vary across states) provides the de facto commit-
ment technology ensuring repayment by the entrepreneur to the guarantor.
Part (iii) is proved by showing that a strictly positive βx cannot be optimal,
since in that case decreasing βx, without changing the payoﬀs of the bank and
guarantor, strictly increases the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ. The intuition for the result
13On marriage as a relational contract see Scott and Scott (1998).
18is that the contract needs to provide the entrepreneur with incentives not to
strategically default. Foreclosing on the secured assets when R1 = x gives the
entrepreneur precisely the opposite incentives from that point of view.
Part (iv) is proved by utilizing the fact that the entrepreneur, who has all
the ex ante bargaining power, maximizes his payoﬀ by paying both the bank and
guarantor as little as possible.
The proof of part (v) is by contradiction - the relaxed program is solved and
the result shown to contradict the ignored renegotiation constraint. Essential to
the proof is the assumption that the y’s cannot be paid out of the guarantor’s (or
entrepreneur’s) share of the relationship asset. The intuition is that the renegoti-
ation constraint must bind in order to provide the incentive for the entrepreneur
to repay the debt in the good income state. If there is no incentive for the en-
trepreneur to repay in the good income state, then the guarantor will not sign
the contract.
Contractual Ineﬃciency Since β0 = 0 in the relaxed program leads to a
contradiction, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Second Best Eﬃciency). the optimal β0 is bounded away from
zero.
Even though asset foreclosure is ex post ineﬃcient when R1 = 0, nonetheless
it will occur. This ineﬃciency arises from the twin eﬀects of limited liability
and contractual incompleteness. Recall that the ﬁrst best involves β0 = 0. The
ﬁrst best can never be achieved since there is always some asset liquidation in
equilibrium. A positive β0 is needed to provide some disincentive to strategic
default.
19The standard debt contract (β0 = 1) provides the correct incentives, but
involves too much punishment. From the proofs in appendix B it can be seen
that total expected welfare in this model is
W
i = θx − K + r + S
Ez − EL
i (1.8)
where the ﬁrst three terms are the net present value of the project in the absence of
liquidation, and the ﬁnal term, representing the eﬃciency loss due to contractual
incompleteness, is deﬁned in proposition 2. While β0 = 1 is a feasible solution, it
is dominated for most parameter values by the optimal solution to be presented
in proposition 2.
Remark 1 (Standard Debt Contract). In general the standard debt contract
is not optimal: β0 is less than one.
It is the fact that liquidation occurs on the equilibrium path that makes a stan-
dard debt contract sub-optimal: it is socially wasteful to punish the entrepreneur
more than is necessary to prevent strategic default.14 This result provides some
basis for judicial concern about the nature of third party guarantee contracts,
which are standard debt contracts. We consider this question further below.
Solving the linear program Proposition 1 enables us to simplify (Fi)
and consequently to ﬁnd this optimal level of contractual ineﬃciency.15
Proposition 2 (Contractual Ineﬃciency).
14This is similar to the argument in, say, Green and Porter (1984), or, more generally, in any
repeated game model with noisy observation of (stage game) outcomes or probabilistic moves
which make all paths in the game reachable with positive probability.
15Here we are re-inserting the superscript on the contract variable β.
20(i) In the optimal contract, the eﬃciency loss due to contractual incompleteness
is
EL

















E] + (1 − θ)[Li − κi
z(1 − SE)z]
(1.10)
(which will be a solution to (Fi) provided that βi
0 is not greater than one).
Proof See Appendix B.
Equation (1.9) shows that the eﬃciency loss due to contractual incompleteness
is the expected loss of surplus (the term in square brackets) when the date 1 return
is zero (with probability 1 − θ) and the bank gets the right to foreclose on the
secured asset(s) (with probability βi
0). Equation (1.10) depicts the determinants
of the ex ante (contractually) chosen probability of ex post foreclosure. (Recall
from subsection 1.2.2 the equations for Li and gi
E.)
Costly outsiders To obtain some intuition for this result, note that equa-
tion (1.10) is just the renegotiation constraint after equations (1.2) and (1.3) have
been substituted into it. It can be seen from the denominator of (1.10) that the
eﬀect of increasing the entrepreneur’s outside asset share (SE) is independent of
θ: the greater his share, the lower is EL. Since SE also enters W i in equation
(1.8) directly (and not just through EL) this is not conclusive, but we have the
following easily proved proposition.
Proposition 3 (Costliness of TPGs). W i is monotone increasing in SE.
As stated in the introduction, third party guarantees (deﬁned as low SE (and
in the pure case by SE = 0)), are not a low-cost ﬁnancing option. This fact will
21become prominent when determining the pattern of collateralized ﬁnance in the
next section.
The basic tradeoﬀ It can also be seen from the denominator of equa-
tion (1.10) that when θ is high (low risk) concern revolves more about the en-
trepreneur’s bargaining power than the liquidity value of the asset(s) - to prevent
strategic default, β0 must be raised the more the entrepreneur is likely to receive
a greater share of the ex post surplus after strategically defaulting. Thus ‘weak’
entrepreneurs can have lower ﬁnance costs. When θ is low (high risk), concern
shifts to the value of the asset(s) in liquidation. The greater the ex post ineﬃ-
ciency, the lower is EL. We summarize these statements in the following easily
proved proposition.
Proposition 4 (Eﬃciency Tradeoﬀ).
(i) EL is monotone decreasing in τE.
(ii) EL is monotone increasing in α and λ.
The model is characterized by the fact that the greater the ex post ineﬃciency
the greater the ex ante eﬃciency. Stated another way, there exists a trade-oﬀ
between the ex post cost of bankruptcy (wasteful asset liquidation) and the ex
ante eﬃciency in ensuring that viable projects are undertaken. The paradox ap-
pears to be that, the closer the relationship, the more beneﬁcial the personal
collateral from a commercial perspective, but the greater the concern from a
non-commercial perspective. The beneﬁcial commitment eﬀect of a relationship
appears to be recognized by lenders. Thus, as the author of a survey of bank
branch-level lending managers in the UK concluded, “private commitments en-
hanced public enforceability”:
22Lenders acknowledged the problems inherent in taking security from a
person in an intimate relationship with the debtor, but they also em-
phasized the importance to them in commercial terms of the surety’s
emotional investments in both the relationship with the debtor and
the home (where relevant).16
Judicial concern What makes the trade-oﬀ especially interesting in the
context of spousal guarantees is that necessary default in the case of such guar-
antees involves important relationship asset loss, which can aﬀect some classes
of guarantor severely. This is especially so for those classes of guarantor recog-
nized by common law courts as being especially in need of protection (such as
stay-at-home wives or grandparents) because of an asymmetry in outside earning
potential vis-a-viz the entrepreneur. With perhaps an excessive regard for the
ex post regret obviously felt in those instances when loans or loved ones turn
sour, third party guarantees have been dubbed in some legal scholarship a form
of ‘sexually transmitted debt’.17
During the nineties courts in the Anglo-American world grappled with the
policy trade-oﬀs involved in permitting the enforceability of third-party guaran-
tees.18 As an example, the leading House of Lords case (Barclays Bank Plc v
O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180.) involved a wife suing to prevent a bank foreclosing
on the matrimonial home. She had co-signed a guarantee as backing for business
interests in which her husband was involved (and which did not directly involve
16See Fehlberg (1997) at page 204.
17See for example Fehlberg (1997).
18See the surveys of cases and jurisdiction by (for example) Fehlberg (1995) and Trebilcock
and Ballantyne-Elliot (1998).
23her). In their decision the law lords were aware that any desire for paternalis-
tic circumvention of the usual legal and economic norms of freedom to contract
should be balanced against the concern that ‘the wealth currently tied up in
the matrimonial home does not become economically sterile’.19 A ban on such
guarantees would freeze forever all assets held in domestic use while unfettered
freedom exposes a subset of guarantors to intolerable risk of primary asset loss.
Proposition 2 informs us that the optimal guarantee contract trades oﬀ these
concerns.
From the point of view of a court deciding between ex ante versus ex post
eﬃciency, it is not obvious normatively which way the balance should be tipped.
As a general rule it is true that the combination of proposition 4 and remark
1 suggests some validation for judicial suspicion of standard form debt guaran-
tees with automatic foreclosure. By seeking to diminish the incidence of such
guarantees, the courts are, in eﬀect, attempting to decrease β0, and there are
eﬃciency-enhancing reasons for them to do so.
Aware of legal concern about ‘coercion’, banking associations in the United
Kingdom and United States have drawn up conventions which branch managers
must take into account when presenting third-party guarantees for signing.20 Such
conventions include the requirement on lenders to provide basic information about
the nature and possible consequences of signing a guarantee (like a ‘health warn-
ing’) and also to urge guarantees to seek independent (that is, independent of the
19The contractual legal doctrines protecting disadvantaged persons in common law countries
fall under the rubric of equity. For a summary of equitable doctrines in contract see Hanbury
and Martin: Modern Equity (2002).
20See for example the UK BBA (1994).
24guarantee’s representatives) legal advice before signing.21
1.4 The pattern of collateralized loans
In this section we explore the determinants of the pattern of collateralized small
business ﬁnance. The ﬁrst subsection outlines the empirical evidence of a pattern
while subsection 1.4.2 presents the basic result. Subsection 1.4.3 gives a brief
numerical example.
1.4.1 Motivation
Data on small business ﬁnancing has traditionally been sparse. But beginning in
1987, the Federal Reserve Board, in association with the Oﬃce of Small Business
Administration, has conducted ﬁve-yearly surveys of small businesses (deﬁned as
500 employees or less) seeking especially information on owner characteristics and
funding sources. Called the National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF),
these sequential cross-sectional samples (1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003) now comprise
the main source of information on small business ﬁnancial structure and during
the 1990s have given rise to an empirical literature examining its ﬁndings.22
Figure C.1 in Appendix C depicts a table taken from Petersen and Rajan
(1994). The table shows loan proﬁle by ﬁrm size (Panel A) and ﬁrm age (Panel B).
The data is taken from the 1987 version of the NSSBF. Note in both panels of the
table column three, which states the percentage (with respect to the whole survey
21These are the same type of measures (although perhaps strengthened) adopted by the
House of Lords in its Barclays Bank decision.
22The data and supporting documents can be found at:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss3/nssbftoc.htm.
25sample of over 3000 ﬁrms) of ﬁrms in each category with debt. Conditional on a
ﬁrm having debt, the remaining columns show the percentage sources of loans. It
can be seen from the bank column (column six) that the majority of loan ﬁnance is
bank sourced (between 50 and 65 percent). Indeed, distinguishing between inside
and outside sources of loans, the proportion of outside debt sourced from banks is
overwhelming. The table supports the statement made in the introduction that
the majority of small businesses have debts, and the majority of that debt is in
bank loans.
The incidence of committed debt by small businesses is shown in Figure C.2
of Appendix C. It depicts a table taken from Avery et al. (1998). The data in
the table is again based on the NSSBF, but this time both the 1987 and 1993
versions of the survey. The table shows, conditional on a ﬁrm having a loan,
how much of those loans are backed by owner commitments. Committed debt
is deﬁned as loans backed either by guarantees or pledged assets. The table
shows the four possible categories of commitment, as well as (when assets are
pledged) a breakdown of which asset(s) was used to back the pledge (the business
asset, personal asset, or both). The table supports the statement made in the
introduction that the overwhelming majority of bank debt is collateralized.
In order to consider a conditioned sample of collateralized loans we ignore the
ﬁrst and last rows in the table depicted in Figure C.2. The percentage breakdown
of collateralized loans (the remaining rows in the table of Figure C.2) according
to asset(s) used is presented in Table 1.1 for both years (using the dollar value
columns). It can be seen that the overwhelming majority of collateral is pledged
using business assets, thus supporting the statement made in the introduction.
While there is some variation over time (with the business cycle), and while that






Table 1.1: Percentage Incidence of Asset Use in Collateral
collateral is a temporally stable stylized fact. From a business cycle perspective,
note that in 1987 (a time of economic growth and capital gains), the proportion
of personal assets pledged as collateral was much smaller than in 1993 (a time of
recession - or immediate post-recession - and non-increasing house values). On
the other hand, during a recession, the relative value of business assets to personal
assets may have declined even more.
1.4.2 Comparing Asset A and Asset H
Using the results of proposition 2 and the parametric forms for gi
E and Li given




(1 − θ)K[1 − α]
θ[1 − τE(1 − 2α)] + (1 − θ)α
EL
H ≡
(1 − θ){K − r}[1 − λ]
θ[SE − τE(1 − 2λ)] + (1 − θ)[λ − (1 − SE)]
Deﬁne ∆ELA
H ≡ ELA − ELH and ˜ θA|H as the cutoﬀ theta at which the en-
trepreneur is indiﬀerent between using asset A or asset H. The entrepreneur is
27indiﬀerent between using asset A or asset H when ∆ELA





θ[1 − τE(1 − 2α)] + (1 − θ)α
(1 − θ)
−
{K − r}[1 − λ]
θ[SE − τE(1 − 2λ)] + (1 − θ)[λ − (1 − SE)]
(1 − θ) = 0
This implies that
K[1 − α]{θ[S
E − τE(1 − 2λ)] + (1 − θ)[λ − (1 − S
E)]}
− {K − r}[1 − λ][θ[1 − τE(1 − 2α)] + (1 − θ)α] = 0
which can be written as (gathering θ terms)
θ(K[1 − α]{1 − λ − τE(1 − 2λ)} − {K − r}[1 − λ]{1 − α − τE(1 − 2α)})
(1.11)
+K[1 − α][λ − (1 − S
E)] − {K − r}[1 − λ]α = 0
which gives us ﬁnally
θ =
{K − r}[1 − λ]α − K[1 − α][λ − (1 − SE)]
K[1 − α]{1 − λ − τE(1 − 2λ)} − {K − r}[1 − λ]{1 − α − τE(1 − 2α)}
≡ ˜ θA|H
Risk proﬁle We now ﬁnd the curve of indiﬀerence for an entrepreneur de-
ciding between pledging asset A or H.23 The goal is to focus attention on ﬁrm
characteristics and to map these curves in risk-growth (or risk-sales) space and
explore how changes in ﬁrm start-up size and relationship variables shift the pat-
tern of collateral.24 This is done with the following two propositions. We start
23While we do not prove it here, a simple extension shows that it is never optimal to pledge
both assets simultaneously.
24Recall that the ﬁrm variables are: θ,K and r; and that the relationship variables are: λ,
τE and SE.
28with the following proposition concerning which type of ﬁrm risk proﬁle supports
either asset choice.
Proposition 5 (Risk Proﬁle: Comparing Assets A and H). Assume that
K < r. Then equation (1.11) is monotone increasing in θ, which implies that
when θ < ˜ θA|H the entrepreneur prefers securing the project asset (A) and when
θ > ˜ θA|H the entrepreneur prefers securing the relationship asset (H).
Proof See Appendix B.
Recall that θ is the probability of a high date 1 return (probability that ˜ R1
realizes x). High risk ﬁrms prefer using inside assets because, with default more
likely, the optimal contract places greater concern on possible liquidation than
default deterrence, and when asset H is secure the entrepreneur stands to lose
both house and r (recall that he must ‘bribe’ the guarantor with the full date 2
return in order to use asset H as security), while when only asset A is secured he
at least gets to keep his share of the house (though he still loses r). Conditional on
default having occurred, from the entrepreneur’s perspective securing the house
is payoﬀ dominated by securing the business asset. This result is independent of
the size of the entrepreneur’s asset share and of the relative ineﬃciencies of inside
versus outside asset loss (α versus λ).
Slope of ˜ θA|H and comparative statics The slope of the indiﬀerence curve
depends on the relative magnitudes of the ex post ineﬃciencies of the two assets.
The following proposition is easily proved.
Proposition 6. Assume the same assumption as in proposition 5 above and also
assume that 1
2 > α > λ > 0. Then
(i) ˜ θA|H is monotone increasing in r, and
29(ii) ˜ θA|H is monotone decreasing in SE and monotone increasing in λ and τE.
Proof See Appendix B.
Part (i) of the proposition states that the entrepreneur’s indiﬀerence curve is
upward-sloping in θ − r space. That the indiﬀerence curve is positively sloped
might seem somewhat counter-intuitive (since low default risk and high growth
prospects could be regarded as complements), but the result is driven by the
fact that the use of a relationship asset de facto makes contractible - between
entrepreneur and guarantor - the otherwise non-contractible second period return.
To see this, start at a point on the indiﬀerence curve and move horizontally to
the right. The entrepreneur is in the region where he prefers to use the business
asset. This is because, by moving to the right, we have increased the future
return of the ﬁrm and thereby increased the ‘cost’ to the entrepreneur of using
the relationship asset as security rather than the business asset (recall that the
entrepreneur ‘bribes’ the guarantor by oﬀering her all of the second period return).
To convince the entrepreneur to use the relationship asset instead of the business
asset given the new future growth proﬁle of the ﬁrm, the entrepreneur must be
reassured that the ﬁrm is less risky. This is because, by using the relationship
asset, the entrepreneur runs the risk after necessary default of losing everything:
both the second period return (promised to the guarantor) and his share of the
house. Therefore, he will want added reassurance that necessary default is less
likely. That is, we must move vertically upwards.
Part (ii) of the proposition states how the indiﬀerence curve is eﬀected by
changes in family characteristics. An increase in the entrepreneur’s share of the
relationship asset increases the use of the outside asset as security. This is yet
another statement that outside party involvement raises the costs of using a per-
30sonal asset. Greater ex post ineﬃciency of liquidating the relationship asset also
leads to its increased use (its beneﬁts as a pre-commitment device is enhanced).
And ﬁnally, increasing the entrepreneur’s ex post intra-familial bargaining power
decreases the use of the relationship asset, since it increases his incentives to
strategically default when that asset is used and so makes it relatively less at-
tractive as a pre-commitment technology compared to the business asset.
The basic lesson is that using the personal asset exposes the entrepreneur
to greater ex post loss, which makes it an unattractive security option for high
risk ﬁrms (where the contractual design problem focuses more on the possibility
of ex post loss) but on the other hand does make it a more attractive security
option for low risk ﬁrms (where the contractual design problem focuses more on
the ex ante need to provide the entrepreneur with disincentives to strategically
default). This greater exposure to ex post loss for the entrepreneur of using the
relationship asset lies in the fact that the entrepreneur is forced to promise to
hand over all his future return from the business to the guarantor to convince
her to co-sign the security, and that this promise in turn is binding vis-a-vis
entrepreneur and guarantor (as it could not be vis-a-vis the bank) because of
the pre-existing relational contracting dynamic (not explicitly modelled) between
them. The need for the entrepreneur to hand over all the second period return if
he wants to use the relationship asset instead of the business asset is an artifact of
the binary return space and the ﬁniteness of the modelling environment - a model
that allowed convexities in returns and payments, or which explicitly dynamised
the relationship between entrepreneur and guarantor (so that the second period
return from the business would be shared between them), would produce a less
drastic-seeming outcome, although the basic intuition and trade-oﬀs of the model
would remain the same.
311.4.3 A brief numerical example
Figure C.3 in Appendix C shows in θ−r space the ˜ θA|H curve using the parameter
choices shown in Table 1.2. The ﬁgure depicts a loan of K = 50,000 when the
value of the relationship asset (a home) is z = 100,000. Note that, because we
conﬁne ourselves to ﬁrms for which K < r, the vertical axis begins at r = 50,000.
The values in the table are chosen for expository purposes only, and they are
consistent with the assumptions in the propositions. That the chosen value of
K is a reasonable ‘ballpark’ choice for expository purposes can be seen from the
table depicted in Figure C.4 in Appendix C. That table is taken from Hurst and
Lusardi (2004) and depicts average start up amounts across industry using the
1987 NSSBF. It can be seen from that table that median startup costs range from
about $9,500 for the construction industry to about $55,000 for the retail trade,
with some ﬁrms in some industries needing as much as $200,000.
The slope of ˜ θA|H is positive as required by proposition 6. The regions of
asset choice, derived from proposition 5, are also shown in the diagram, namely,
that ﬁrms lying to the right of the indiﬀerence curve use the business asset, while
ﬁrms lying to the left use the relationship asset. It can be seen that likelihood of
personal asset use is decreasing in both r and θ.
In terms of comparative statics on K, it is easily shown that increasing K
both shifts the curve to the right and makes it ﬂatter. Thus the model predicts
that, in industries with greater startup costs, we would expect to see a greater
proportion of ﬁrms using personal assets, concentrated at the low default risk end
of the ﬁrm distribution (alternatively, concentrated among relatively older ﬁrms).
Comparative statics on the relationship parameters (part (ii) of proposition








Table 1.2: List of parameter values used in numerical example
of the curve also changes for some of them). As an example, an increase in the
bargaining power of guarantors over time would be represented by an outward
shift of the ˜ θA|H curve, leading to the prediction that over the last few decades,
with the rise of feminism and the increasing outside earning capacity of formerly
stay-at-home spouses, we should expect to see a greater use of the family home
as collateral for outside businesses.
1.5 Human Capital and Startups
The previous analysis assumed the entrepreneur had both types of asset at his
disposal, and merely needed to decide which one to use. But many of the high-
growth ﬁrms of the 1990s were characterized by low physical and high human
capital. In such a ﬁrm, there are few business assets to secure and of course the
entrepreneur’s human capital in incapable of acting as a commitment technology.
In that case, the only option may be to secure the outside asset. This case of the
pure use of a personal asset as collateral leads to the following proposition.
33Proposition 7 (Risk Proﬁle for Pure Personal Asset Case).
Deﬁne θX(λ,τE,SE) ≡
1 − SE − λ




and ∆ ≡ θX − θ∗
(i) K > r (K < r) implies θ > θX (θ < θX),
(ii) Deﬁne Λ ⊂ [0,1] as the range of projects whose risk proﬁle θ is such that
the projects are credit rationed.
For the case of K > r: If ∆ > 0 then Λ = [θ∗,θX] (if ∆ ≤ 0 then Λ is
empty)
For the case of K < r: Λ = [¯ θ,1]
Inside Asset Only: When only asset A is available for use as a security,
Λ is always empty.
(iii) For each of the arguments of θX we have that θX is decreasing in SE and
λ, and decreasing (increasing) in τE when λ < 1
2 (λ > 1
2).
Proof See Appendix B.
θX is the denominator of β0 set to zero, while θ∗ is a rearrangement of the ex
ante condition on project viability, namely θx + r ≥ K. Note that the ﬁrst is a
function only of relationship variables while the second is a function only of ﬁrm
variables. The proof of parts (i) and (ii) rely on the fact that β0 must be positive,
as well as on a comparison of θX and θ∗. The proof of part (iii) involves ﬁnding
the signs of the respective derivatives. The results depend sensitively on whether
r is greater than or less than K. The case of K < r is likely to represent the
sort of IT sector startups which featured prominently in the media during the
1990s, while examples of low r projects might be loan reﬁnancing or extensions
to extant lines of credit. Figure C.5 in Appendix C shows the proposition in θ−r
34space. Note that the third claim of part (ii) of the proposition states that for
ﬁrms which can use an inside asset (and only use an inside asset), there is no
equivalent ‘credit rationed’ region as there is for ﬁrms conﬁned solely to the use
of an outside asset - yet another instance of the greater costliness of recourse to
outsider-involvement funding.
Within the four quadrants of risk-growth space depicted in Figure C.5, ﬁrms
located in the upper right hand quadrant are the least likely to have problems
accessing ﬁnancial backing (from any source). Although such ﬁrms are (seemingly
anomalously) ‘credit rationed’ in this model, we know from empirical studies that
the rise of venture capital markets and angel ﬁnancing has been in precisely with
respect to this quadrant (cream skimming). A better interpretation therefore is
that the model does not expect such ﬁrms to need or use bank credit. Indeed,
it is known from surveys of IT startups in the Silicon Valley in the 1990s that
a major reason given by those who eschewed venture capital ﬁnancing in favor
of the stress and risk of mortgaging the house was that they wished to maintain
control over the business, suggestive perhaps of the fact that for ﬁrms at least
near the θX boundary of the K < r half-space, personal collateral bank ﬁnancing
might be regarded as a substitute to VC ﬁnancing.
For the polar opposite case, ﬁrms or projects in the lower left hand quadrant
(high risk, low growth) are the least likely to be able to ﬁnd funding (from any
source) and such ﬁrms continue to be credit rationed even in the presence of a
securitizable outside asset. The incidence of the beneﬁts of personal guarantees
falls to those ﬁrms in the upper left and lower right quadrants. Changes in the
underlying parameters of the model will change the relative sizes of these two
quadrants. In particular, the θ∗ line depends only on ﬁrm characteristics while
the θX depends only on family relationship characteristics.
35One comparative static worth noting involves simultaneous changes in en-
trepreneurial bargaining power and relationship closeness. Recall that declining
λ means increasing relationship closeness. It is not unreasonable to suppose that
greater emotional bonds can make us more susceptible to moral suasion or emo-
tional pressure to act contrary to our independently considered interests. It is
easily veriﬁed that lim
λ→0+,τE→1−θX → 1 (since θX ∈ [0,1]). This result, combined
with part (i) of proposition 7, informs us that for projects with low growth poten-
tial none will be ﬁnanced (that is, regardless of risk proﬁle) while for projects with
high growth potential all will be. Whether coercion increases close to this limit
is not obvious merely by inspection of part (iii) of proposition 7 since the eﬀects
of a decrease in λ and an increase in τE work in opposite directions. However,







[1 − λ + τE(1 − 2λ)] − 2SE[λ + τE − 2τEλ]
−[1 − λ − τE(1 − 2λ)]3
and further taking the limit as λ → 0+ and τE → 1− we see that the eﬀect
of changing λ dominates (limλ→0+,τE→1− = −∞), so that increasing ‘closeness’
(decreasing λ) means increasing θX. Hence if we deﬁne ‘coercion’ as the simul-
taneous increase in τE and decrease in λ, then we have the following corollary,
which summarizes the above statements.
Corollary 2. As ‘coercion’ increases, fewer projects of low growth potential will
be funded and more projects of higher growth potential with be funded. In the
limit (as λ → 0+ and τE → 1−) only high growth projects will be funded.
Close relationships between guarantor and guarantee should only be used to
fund high-growth ﬁrms (startups). This result is mirrored by the comparative
static on SE. It is worth noting in this context that the fact situation underlying
36the House of Lords decision of Barclays Bank, discussed in section 1.3, involved
reﬁnancing an existing loan facility rather than an investment in a project de
novo.
1.6 Conclusion and directions for future research
This paper analyzes collateralized asset choice in an optimal incomplete ﬁnancial
contracting environment. The basic point is that personal assets are distinguished
from business assets in that they often involve third parties and the relational dy-
namics that attend them. This outside-party aspect of personal collateral raises
the cost of its use vis-a-viz business collateral and so we would expect, ceteris
paribus, its use to be rarer and only by ﬁrms where the beneﬁts of its use make
its costs tolerable (ﬁrms with low default risk and stable growth prospects). The
optimal collateralized loan contract trades oﬀ the beneﬁts of deterring defaults
against the desire of ensuring that unavoidable defaults are not too costly. The
increased cost of using assets unavoidably associated with outside parties mani-
fests itself in higher foreclosure probabilities because it unilaterally weakens the
disincentive eﬀect of using the outside asset. This does not mean that using the
outside asset is never optimal. In fact, the model predicts that the pattern of
asset use in collateralized loans is characterized by personal asset use for low-risk,
low-growth ﬁrms. For those ﬁrms characterized by high human and low physical
capital, so that there are likely insuﬃciently valuable inside assets to use as se-
curity, the model predicts that personal collateral (and closer relationships) are
valuable for the funding of high risk startups such as was the case in the IT sector
during the 1990s.
An obvious extension to this paper is to take the results and corollarative
37predictions of section 1.4 to small business data, especially to the NSSBF (brieﬂy
discussed in section 1.4.1), but also to the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) -
like the NSSBF, another recurrent survey conducted by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve. The complete absence of data on pure third party guar-
antees necessitates recourse to the establishment of an original dataset, sourced
predominantly by banks. Both of these research agendas are currently being
undertaken by the author.
Further extensions to the model and the research agenda it embodies are fore-
seeable both theoretically and empirically. An obvious extension is to expand the
shorthand assumption used in the paper regarding the contractibility of the date
2 return between the entrepreneur and guarantor by actually modelling the rela-
tional contract (repeated game) between them. While not salient in this paper,
proposed future empirical work on the inﬂuence on small business secured credit
of the heterogeneity of family law property regimes across the states of America
would necessitate the more institutionally nuanced perspective an explicit, em-
bedded modelling of the dynamic relationship between husbands and wives would
provide.
An institution not considered in this paper is (personal) bankruptcy. This is
because secured loans receive priority in any bankruptcy proceeding, and they
also trump the ‘homestead’ exemptions which states otherwise aﬀord personally
bankrupt citizens. Consequently, the terms (collateralized) ‘guarantee’ and ‘col-
lateral’ have been used interchangeably in this paper when in a diﬀerent context
the maintenance of the distinction for bankruptcy proceedings entailed in these
two forms of committed loan ﬁnance would be crucial.
A ﬁnal possible direction for future research involves very small businesses,
38in which the distinction between family and business is almost completely non-
existent. The model in this paper could accommodate an exploration of the added
intricacies involved in home-oﬃce business environments via the introduction of
complementarity between the business asset and the relationship asset. Such a
modiﬁcation would have implications especially for the issue of the inﬂuence of
changes in the business cycle on the pattern of collateralized debt and the credit
crunch which the smallest of small businesses are disproportionately subject to
during downturns.
39CHAPTER 2
Guarantees versus Collateral in Small Business
Debt Financing
2.1 Introduction
The United States is unusual in having pro-debtor bankruptcy laws and, alone
among the industrialized countries, it has a high and rapidly rising bankruptcy
ﬁling rate. The total number of bankruptcy ﬁlings has risen from under 300,000
per year in 1984 to 1.1 million in 1996 and 1.4 million in 1998.1 The common
knowledge in the ﬁnance and banking communities of this large and increasing
number of personal and small business bankruptcy ﬁlings has led researchers
to explore how bankruptcy aﬀects consumers’ and small business entrepreneurs’
ex ante access to credit. When debtors in the United States ﬁle for personal
bankruptcy, many types of debts are discharged, causing losses for creditors.
Under the current law (soon to be changed) debtors who ﬁle under Chapter 7 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code are absolved from the obligation to use future income
to repay their debts and are only obliged to use current wealth to repay debt to
the extent that that wealth exceeds predetermined, statutory exemption levels.
Exemption levels in bankruptcy are set by the state in which the debtor lives
1Bankruptcy ﬁling data are easily obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States,
various editions.
40and they vary widely. Initial research has shown that these exogenous exemption
levels aﬀect the terms on which loans are made across states.2
This paper explains the determinants of committed debt in small business
debt ﬁnancing. Committed debt is a loan that has been either guaranteed and/or
collateralized. Data show (the National Survey of Small Business Finances (here-
after ‘NSSBF’)) that the majority of small business debt is bank-sourced and
that the majority of that debt is committed. In particular, the importance of
commitments to making loan funds available to small businesses has been shown
in Avery et al. (1998) using 1987 and 1993 NSSBF survey data on small business
ﬁnancing: debts without the backing of either guarantees and/or collateral never
comprise more than 15% of all small business loans.3 Committed debt serves the
purpose of ensuring that a business owner’s personal assets are available to the
creditor in the event of bankruptcy even for those small businesses set up as a
corporation and so putatively having the protection of the corporate veil. But
while both types of committed debt (guarantees or collateral) serve the purpose
of removing limited liability for creditors, they are of diﬀering status ex post in
the event of bankruptcy - in particular, collateralized debt is not subject to state-
based homestead exemptions whereas guaranteed debt is. In spite of this clear
advantage, a downside of collateralizing loans is that they are a higher transac-
tion cost form of loan (assets need to be valued and so on) than merely getting
an owner to sign a guarantee in a bank branch.
2Examples of articles which have shown such an aﬀect empirically are Berkowitz and White
(2004), Lin and White (2001) and Berkowitz and Hynes (1999).
3The NSSBF dataset is discussed in more detail in subsections 2.3.1 and 2.4.1.
41Description of model The paper utilizes an ‘incomplete ﬁnancial contract-
ing’ model in the tradition of Aghion and Bolton (1992) to fully characterize the
determinants of committed loan in small business debt ﬁnance. In the model
a wealth constrained entrepreneur seeks funds from a bank, but cannot pre-
committ to repay the bank when the ﬁrm begins showing proﬁt (return streams
are non-contractible). Thus, the entrepreneur and bank must ﬁnd another way
to pre-committ, without which the entrepreneur will be credit-rationed. That
other way involves agreeing ex ante over the distribution of ‘control rights’ over
the business assets, or, in the framework of bankruptcy, over when the creditor
has the right to seize and sell business (or personal) assets. Since those assets
are required by the entrepreneur in order to earn continuing business income, the
possibility of such a change in ownership or control of those assets acts as lever-
age between the lender and lendee ensuring that the latter repays the loan. Such
leverage is required because of the inability of the parties enforceably to contract
on the business’s return stream, opening up the possibility of future strategic de-
fault and contract renegotiation. Without some mechanism of pre-commitment,
the entrepreneur would be credit-constrained regardless of the viability of his
project. There are two assets available to a creditor in bankruptcy in this model:
a business asset and a personal asset. Uncommitted loans are modelled using only
a business asset, while committed loans are modelled using both. The personal
asset can also be secured.
Description of results The paper contains two types of result. First I show
that the choice of committed loans depends on ﬁrm attributes such as default risk
and size (sales), and in particular I show the following fundamental result: the
likelihood of a loan being committed is increasing in ﬁrm default risk and decreing
42in ﬁrm size. This result is consistent with the empirically established fact that,
compared to the universe of all small business loans, the subset of collateralized
loans are on average higher risk. The worst ﬁrms oﬀer to commit loans made to
them, without which commitment they would likely be credit rationed.
The second result oﬀers an explanation for a curiosum in the data on small
business ﬁnancing ﬁrst noted in Berkowitz and White (2004). In that article
it was found that the interest rates on loans facing small businesses did not rise
monotonically in homestead exemption level. The data used was the 1993 NSSBF.
The authors noted a similar (and related) non-monotonicity in the variation with
homestead exemption of the likelihood of a ﬁrm being credit-rationed and loan
size. The authors note that they have no explanation for this surprising empirical
ﬁnding. In section 2.4 we show that non-monotonicities of the type found by
Berkowitz and White (2004) in the NSSBF data arise automatically from the
proposed model, and that the model itself is a relatively simple formulation of the
homestead exemption/personal guarantee environment. The non-monotonicity is
due to the fact that, the higher the homestead exemption level, the more likely
that average house prices fall under that level and so banks and business owners
switch to (the higher transaction cost) collateralized form of loans rather than
just guaranteeing loans.
Outline of paper This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes
and solves the model. Section 2.3 compares the three diﬀerent types of loan con-
tract (considered in this paper) in ﬁrm-characteristic space. Section 2.4 examines
how loan interest rates (proxied by ﬁrm default risk) vary with variations in the
homestead exemption level. Section 2.5 concludes.
432.2 Model
Set-up There are two agents, an entrepreneur seeking a loan and a bank
considering giving one. At date 0 the entrepreneur solves the following linear pro-
gram (call it (F(i))), choosing over the contract Γi = {P0,Px,β0,βx} to maximize
his expected payoﬀ:4









zβ0[φmin(z,γ) + (1 − φ)z(1 − η)]}
subject to the individual rationality constraint of the bank
θ[Px + βxg
i
B] + (1 − θ)[P0 + β0L
i] ≥ K (2.2)
and, in order to ensure that the entrepreneur does not strategically default when
R1 = x, subject also to the following ‘renegotiation constraint’










and subject to the following ‘limited liability’ constraint for the entrepreneur
owing to the assumption of ex ante zero liquid wealth
P0 ≤ 0 and Px ≤ x
and ﬁnally subject to feasibility constraints on the foreclosure probabilities
0 ≤ β0,βx ≤ 1
4Note that each of these contractual terms should also have an i superscript, but to avoid
notational clutter we omit them.







This model contains two in one, depending on whether i = A or AH, where
the letters stand for ﬁrm asset, or both ﬁrm asset and private asset (like a home)
combined. The diﬀerence between these models depends on the diﬀerent values
of the indicator function κi







1 when i = AH
0 when i = A
Interpretation A ﬁrm protected by the corporate veil would be represented
by the model i = A. That is, in bankruptcy the bank only has access to the ﬁrm
assets and not the entrepreneur’s home. Requiring an entrepreneur to guarantee
his ﬁrm’s debts is represented by the model i = AH. That is, in bankruptcy
the bank has access to both ﬁrm assets and the entrepreneur’s home. It is clear
that for most small businesses, regardless of corporate form, the correct model is
i = AH. Thus we have:
When a ﬁrm is a corporation, limited liability implies that the
owner is not legally responsible for the ﬁrm’s debts. However, lenders
to small corporations often require that the owner guarantee the loan
and may also require that the owner give the lender a second mort-
gage on her house. This wipes out the owner’s limited liability for
purposes of the particular loan and makes small corporate ﬁrms in
corporate/noncorporate hybrids.5
5See Berkowitz and White (2004) at page 81.
45Even when the business loan is personally guaranteed, a distinction exists
between secured and unsecured loans. Secured loans trump homestead exemption
laws whereas unsecured loans do not. For this reason, in bankruptcy, secured
loans are invariably completely repaid whereas for unsecured loans this is often
not the case.6 The model when the loan or guarantee is secured has φ = 0. The
homestead exemption is then irrelevant to the extent of the security, represented
by η.
Timing and explanation of model The timing of the two-period model
is set out in ﬁgure 2.1.
The intuition of the model is as follows. A ﬁnancially constrained entrepreneur
seeks funds from an investor in order to exploit an investment opportunity with
upfront cost K. The funds are used to buy a project asset which in turn generates
a return stream. The return is binary stochastic in the ﬁrst period ( ˜ R1) and
determinate in the second period (with value r). The ﬁrst period binary return
gives x > 0 with probability θ and zero with probability 1 − θ. The project is
assumed ex ante viable so that θx + r ≥ K. The model involves the assumption
that, at the time the loan contract is written, the parties to the contract are
not able enforceably to condition on these future ﬁrst period returns, so that
the contract instead must specify who gets control in the ﬁrst period of the
project asset in the event the entrepreneur defaults in that period. Because
the ex ante agreed loan repayment (Pj, where j = 0,x) cannot be enforceably
conditioned on the ﬁrst period return stream (meaning that the contractually
speciﬁed repayment amount can be renegotiated), default can occur strategically
6The general legal principle (there is some ﬁligree) is that secured transactions trump the
state and federal homestead exemptions (see generally Baird (2000)).
46Figure 2.1: Timeline of Model
(that is, when ˜ R1 = x) and not just because the return was zero. To minimize
the incentives for such strategic default the investor must liquidate part of the
project asset in the event of non-strategic default, even though such liquidation
is ex post ineﬃcient. The reason such liquidation has the right incentive eﬀects
is because the second period return r (which accrues only to the entrepreneur)
depends on the entrepreneur controlling the project asset. It is easily seen that in
a one period model the entrepreneur would always default. The loan funds would
therefore never be forwarded by the bank in that case (in spite of the project being
ex ante viable). Thus it is the possibility of the bank’s being able to deprive the
entrepreneur of his second period return which gives the asset control decision
47an important ‘leverage’ eﬀect between entrepreneur and bank, enabling otherwise
credit rationed ﬁrms to receive loans. In this paper there are two assets, a project
asset and an outside asset completely independent of the project and its returns.
Both assets (separately or in combination) can act as security for the loan.
Ex post renegotiation The contract {P0,Px,β0,βx} involves the entrepreneur
agreeing to pay P0 when the ﬁrst period return is zero and Px when the ﬁrst pe-
riod return is x. In the event of default, the contract speciﬁes that the bank
will have the right to liquidate the project and/or the private asset (depending
on the model) with probability β0 if the entrepreneur in fact paid P0 and with
probability βx if the entrepreneur in fact paid Px. Sale of the asset(s) is however
not automatic. This is because the asset(s) is/are worth more in the hands of the
entrepreneur than what the bank can get for them on the market. Thus there
exists an ex post surplus to be renegotiated over. If the bank sells the project as-
set A then it receives only a fraction of what the entrepreneur would have earned
with it, that is, the bank gets αr, where α ∈ (0,1). And if the bank sells the
private asset H then it receives less than what the asset, say a family home, is
worth to its owner, that is, the bank gets λz, where λ ∈ (0,1) and z is the value
of the private asset when kept in the entrepreneur’s hands.
The variable γ ∈ [0,∞) represents the level of the homestead exemption:
even when the bank liquidates the relationship asset H, the amount γ remains
with the entrepreneur by law (provided the loan is unsecured). This is true
provided that the value of the house is greater than the exogenously set homestead
level; otherwise, the entrepreneur receives the full amount of the house z. The
‘liquidation value’ (Li) can then be deﬁned as
L
i = [αr + κ
i
z[φmax(0,λ∆) + (1 − φ)zλη]]
48where ∆ ≡ z − γ.
Renegotiation - which does not occur in equilibrium, because it is fully antic-
ipated - is in the form of generalized Nash bargaining, where each agent is exoge-
nously endowed with bargaining strength τi with i = E,B and where
P
τi = 1.
The amount which each agent receives after renegotiation is gi
E or gi
B respectively,
which is simply the proportional share - determined by bargaining power - of the




E = τE{r(1 − α) + κ
i
z[φ(z − λ∆)1∆>0 + z(1 − φ)(1 − λη)]}
It is assumed that the entrepreneur is not permitted to bargain away his home-
stead exemption-protected private asset residual in any ex post renegotiations,
an assumption in accordance with existing bankruptcy law.
Solving the model This is a model within the ‘incomplete ﬁnancial con-
tracting’ approach of Aghion and Bolton (1992), Hart and Moore (1994) and
Hart and Moore (1998).7 For a summary of the standard framework and re-
lated literature see chapter 5 of Hart (1995). The details of the solution of this
contractual problem can be found in Scheelings (2004) (which is just chapter 1
above) and will not be repeated here. Obviously the ﬁrst best could be achieved
if comprehensive contracts could be written ex ante. But the twin eﬀects of con-
tractual incompleteness and a wealth constrained entrepreneur mean that some
ineﬃciency is unavoidable. The following proposition states just that.
Proposition 8 (Contractual Ineﬃciency).
7It is closely based on Bolton and Scharfstein (1996).
49(i) In the optimal contract, the eﬃciency loss due to contractual incompleteness
is
EL




z[φmin(z,γ) + (1 − φ)z(1 − η)] − L
i} (2.4)







E] + (1 − θ)Li (2.5)
(which will be a solution to (Fi) provided the RHS is not greater than one).
Proof It is easily shown that βx = P0 = 0 and that the ﬁrst two constraints
bind. Rewrite the program with these changes and then substitute the bank’s IR
constraint into both the objective function and the entrepreneur’s IC constraint.
This gives two equations in the one remaining choice variable, namely β0. The
new objective function becomes




z[φmin(z,γ) + (1 − φ)z(1 − η)] − L
i}
so that ELi in equation (2.4) is simply deﬁned as the last term of this formula
for social welfare in this model, while the new IC constraint for the entrepreneur
is simply equation (2.5).
Equation (2.4) shows that the eﬃciency loss due to contractual incompleteness
is the expected loss of surplus (the term in the braces) when the date 1 return
is zero (with probability 1 − θ) and the bank gets the right to foreclose on the
secured asset(s) (with probability βi
0). Equation (2.5) depicts the determinants of
the ex ante (contractually) chosen probability of ex post foreclosure. Because βi
0 is
embedded in equation (2.4) we can see that the ex ante eﬃciency loss depends on
the ex post ineﬃciency both directly (the term in square brackets) and indirectly
(through βi
0). In fact, these eﬀects work in opposite directions.
502.3 Comparison of debt contracts
2.3.1 Motivation
Data on small business ﬁnancing has traditionally been sparse. But beginning in
1987, the Federal Reserve Board, in association with the Oﬃce of Small Business
Administration, has conducted ﬁve-yearly surveys of small businesses (deﬁned as
500 employees or less) seeking especially information on owner characteristics and
funding sources. Called the National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF),
these sequential cross-sectional samples (1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003) now comprise
the main source of information on small business ﬁnancial structure and during
the 1990s have given rise to an empirical literature examining its ﬁndings.8
The incidence of committed debt by small businesses was shown in Figure
C.2 in appendix C. Recall that it depicts a table taken from Avery et al. (1998).
The data in the table is based on the 1987 and 1993 versions of the NSSBF
survey. The table shows, conditional on a ﬁrm having a loan, how much of those
loans are backed by owner commitments. Committed debt is deﬁned as loans
backed either by guarantees or pledged assets. The table shows the four possible
categories of commitment, as well as (when assets are pledged) a breakdown of
which asset(s) was used to back the pledge (the business asset, personal asset, or
both). It will be noted from the table that the overwhelming majority of bank
debt is collateralized.
Note that the model in this paper does not capture every aspect of this table.
In particular, there is no scope for modelling a security on the business asset(s)
8The data and supporting documents can be found at:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss3/nssbftoc.htm.
51(the most common type of security) using the model of section 2.2, nor is the
whole of the category ‘Unguaranteed and secured by:’ captured by the model of
section 2.2.
2.3.2 Analysis
In the NSSBF, both corporate and noncorporate ﬁrms are sampled. When ﬁrms
are set up as a corporation then, technically, the liability of the ﬁrm’s debt lies
with the ﬁrm and not personally with it’s owners or equity holders: lenders are
legally not able to go after the personal assets of the business’ owners even if the
assets in the ﬁrm are insuﬃcient to recover outstanding loans. Such a situation is
represented by the model with i = A. That is why the majority of small business
owners are required (or volunteer) to commit personal assets to any loans taken
out by the ﬁrm (represented by the model with i = AH). This section outlines
the conditions under which an entrepreneur is indiﬀerent between committing
and not committing the debt. Because committed debt can either be guaranteed
or secured, there are in fact two indiﬀerence curves.
2.3.2.1 Setup
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52An entrepreneur is indiﬀerent between a committed and uncommitted transaction
when ELAH − ELA = 0. In parametric form, this gives
(1 − θ)K{r + z − [φmin(z,γ) + (1 − φ)z(1 − η)] − LAH}
θ[r + z − gAH
E ] + (1 − θ)LAH −
(1 − θ)K{r − LA}
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Xα − (1 − α)LAH
(1 − α)[r + z − gAH
E − LAH] + X[(1 − α)(1 − τE)]
≡ ¯ θAH|A (2.7)
where the substitutions gA
E and LA have been made and where for notational
convenience we have set X ≡ r +z −[φmin(z,γ)+(1−φ)z(1−η)]−LAH. Note
that the indiﬀerence curve is independent of the size of the loan, K. Equation
(2.7) is really two equations in one, depending on whether a security is taken over











(z − γ)(α − λ)
(1 − α)(1 − τE)[2r(1 − α) + 2z − γ]
(2.9)
53where, in equation (2.9), we have only considered the case where ∆ = (z−γ) > 0,
and the superscripts s and u represent the cases of when the house is secured or
unsecured. The case where ∆ = (z − γ) < 0 need not be considered because in
that case, ¯ θu
AH|A = 0 and we would never see a committed loan (because, if a
security on the home is not an option, and the homestead exemption is higher
than the private asset, the commitment is non-binding.)
Finally, for some of the results that follow, we require the following simple
assumption.
Assumption 1. (α − λ) > 0 and z > 1
We maintain this assumption throughout the rest of the paper. It implies
that the loss of the house is more costly to the entrepreneur than the loss of the
business assets.
2.3.2.2 Comparing uncommitted and committed debts in θ − r space
For the analysis of this subsection the relevant equations are (2.8) and (2.9). We
wish to examine how the decisions to commit a loan, and whether to secure the
commitment, depend on ﬁrm characteristics like default risk (θ) and ﬁrm size (or
sales) (r). We have the following proposition:
Proposition 9.
(i) For both ¯ θs
AH|A and ¯ θu
AH|A, equation (2.6) is monotone increasing in θ, which
implies that when θ < ¯ θs
AH|A (¯ θu
AH|A) the entrepreneur prefers to commit the
loan, and when θ > ¯ θs
AH|A (¯ θu
AH|A) the entrepreneur prefers not to commit
the loan.
54(ii) Both ¯ θs
AH|A and ¯ θu
AH|A are monotone decreasing in r in the relevant range.
Proof
(i) This is obvious from the fact that the denominators of both curves are
positive.






−2zη(1 − α)2(1 − τE)(α − λ)
{(1 − α)(1 − τE)[2r(1 − α) + z(1 + η)]}2
which is negative by assumption 1. Similarly for ¯ θu
AH|A.
Note from part (i) of the proposition that the basic ﬁrm characteristics un-
derlying the decision whether to commit the loan are independent of whether the
commitment is secured or not, in particular, it is seen that in both cases high risk
ﬁrms are more likely to have committed loans, a fact conﬁrmed in empirical and
survey studies (see for example Mann (1997b) and Mann (1997a)).9 Both curves
asymptote along the r axis in θ − r space.
Proposition 10. Deﬁne ˆ γ ≡ z(1 − η).
(i) When γ ≤ ˆ γ we have ¯ θs
AH|A > ¯ θu
AH|A for all r (the two curves intersect
outside the relevant range), and
(ii) when γ > ˆ γ the two curves intersect within the relevant range at the point
(˙ θ, ˙ r) where
˙ θ =
zη(α − λ)[z(1 − η) + γ]
(1 − α)(1 − τE)[zγ(2 + η) + z2η(1 − η)]
> 0
9Recall that low θ represents high default risk.
55and
˙ r =
−z[z(1 − η) − γ]
2(1 − α)[z(1 − η) + γ]
> 0
such that for r < ˙ r we have ¯ θs
AH|A < ¯ θu




Proof Equating ¯ θs
AH|A and ¯ θu
AH|A gives
zη(α − λ)
(1 − α)(1 − τE)[2r(1 − α) + z(1 + η)]
=
(z − γ)(α − λ)
(1 − α)(1 − τE)[2r(1 − α) + 2z − γ]
(2.10)
which after manipulation gives ﬁnally
r =
−z[z(1 − η) − γ]
2(1 − α)[z(1 − η) + γ]
≡ ˙ r (2.11)
And substituting this back into ¯ θs
AH|A gives (after manipulation)
θ =
zη(α − λ)[z(1 − η) + γ]
(1 − α)(1 − τE)[zγ(2 + η) + z2η(1 − η)]
≡ ˙ θ
It is easily seen by examination of the denominator of equation (2.11) that ˙ r ≤ 0
whenever γ ≤ ˆ γ, so that one curve must lie always above the other in the relevant
range. Substituting γ = 0 into equation (2.10) then gives
η
2r(1 − α) + z(1 + η)
−
1
2r(1 − α) + 2z
> 0
because, given assumption 1, 1 − η < z[1 − η]. When γ > ˆ γ the intersection is in
the relevant range (˙ r > 0) and then, substituting ˙ r +  (for small , where  > 0)
into equation (2.10) gives
zη(α − λ)
(1 − α)(1 − τE)[2(˙ r + )(1 − α) + z(1 + η)]
−
(z − γ)(α − λ)
(1 − α)(1 − τE)[2(˙ r + )(1 − α) + 2z − γ]
or
(α − λ)
(1 − α)(1 − τE)

zη
[2˙ r(1 − α) + z(1 + η) + 2(1 − α)]
−
(z − γ)
[2˙ r(1 − α) + 2z − γ + 2(1 − α)]







[2˙ r(1 − α) + z(1 + η) + 2(1 − α)]
−
(z − γ)
[2˙ r(1 − α) + 2z − γ + 2(1 − α)]
−
zη + (z − γ)
{[2˙ r(1 − α) + z(1 + η) + 2(1 − α)][2˙ r(1 − α) + 2z − γ + 2(1 − α)]}






{zη[2˙ r(1 − α) + 2z − γ] − (z − γ)[2˙ r(1 − α) + z(1 + η)} − zη + (z − γ)








2˙ r(1 − α) + z(1 + η)
−
(z − γ)
2˙ r(1 − α) + 2z − γ
−
zη − (z − γ)
[2˙ r(1 − α) + z(1 + η)][2˙ r(1 − α) + 2z − γ]






zη − (z − γ)
[2˙ r(1 − α) + z(1 + η)][2˙ r(1 − α) + 2z − γ]

which is positive within the relevant range (ie, when z(1 − η) ≤ γ ≤ z). So
to the right of the intersection point (˙ θ, ˙ r) we have shown ¯ θs
AH|A > ¯ θu
AH|A. And
analogously to the left of the intersection point.
The two parts of the proposition are most intuitively discussed in the context
of ﬁgure 2.2a and ﬁgure 2.2b. Note ﬁrst that both curves have negative slope, so
that low risk and large sales are complements as we would expect. Also that above
each curve we are in the region where no commitment is given, whereas below
each curve we are in the region where a commitment is given (where the type of
the commitment depends on the curve). From ﬁgure 2.2 is can be seen that the
two curves do not intersect, so that they divide θ − r space into three regions.
In region A the entrepreneur prefers not to commit the loan, in region B he can
57Figure 2.2: The indiﬀerence curves in θ − r space for secured and unsecured
commitments depending on whether a) γ ≤ z(1 − η) or else b) γ > z(1 − η).
choose between not committing the loan and committing it with a security (but
not a guarantee), while in region C he always chooses to commit the loan, and can
choose between guarantees or security. Alternatively, whenever ˆ γ > z(1−η) then
the two curves intersect and θ − r space is divided into four regions rather than
three. With respect to large ﬁrms (right of ˙ r), then (depending on the riskiness
of the ﬁrm) they choose (in increasing order of risk) between no commitments,
an unsecured commitment or no commitment (region B2), and ﬁnally between
unsecured and secured commitments. With respect to smaller ﬁrms (left of ˙ r),
they choose between no commitments, secured commitments or no commitments
(region B1), and ﬁnally between secured or unsecured commitments.
58The next proposition deals with the comparative statics of the indiﬀerence
















































Proof Each of the proofs rely on assumption 1 and the fact that, for the
secured indiﬀerence curve, γ ≤ z. We only prove the ﬁrst part explicitly: the
other parts are proved via a similar appeal to basic calculus.








= sign[η(α − λ)(1 − α)(1 − τE)[2r(1 − α)]] > 0







= sign{−(α − λ)(1 − α)(1 − τE)[2r(1 − α) + γ]} < 0
The other parts of the proposition are proved in a like manner.
From part (i) of the proposition we can see that rising house prices will shift
the ¯ θs
AH|A curve up and the ¯ θu
AH|A curve down, so that we would expect to see a
rise in the proportion of loans backed by a security. From part (ii) we can see
59that a rise in the amount of the asset that is secured shifts the ¯ θs
AH|A curve up,
whereas increases in either the entrepreneur’s bargaining power or the ineﬃciency
of liquidating the personal asset shifts both curves down, so that in either case
we would expect to see fewer committed loans.
Finally, comparing the case of γ > 0 with the case of γ = 0 we have:
Proposition 12. Focusing solely on ¯ θu
AH|A, denote the case of γ = 0 by ¯ θu
γ=0.
Then we have ¯ θu
AH|A − ¯ θu
γ=0 < 0 for all r in the relevant range (ie, for γ ≤ z).




AH|A − ¯ θ
u
γ=0 =
(z − γ)(α − λ)
(1 − α)(1 − τE)[2r(1 − α) + 2z − γ]
−
z(α − λ)
(1 − α)(1 − τE)[2r(1 − α) + 2z]
=
(α − λ)
(1 − α)(1 − τE)

(z − γ)
[2r(1 − α) + 2z − γ]
−
z




(1 − α)(1 − τE)

(z − γ)[2r(1 − α) + 2z] − z[2r(1 − α) + 2z − γ]
[2r(1 − α) + 2z − γ][2r(1 − α) + 2z]

and now set r = 0 to get
¯ θ
u










a result that is true for all r within the relevant range because the intersection
point of the two curves is at r = −z
2(1−α) < 0.
The next section deals in greater detail with the comparative statics of the
indiﬀerence curves with respect to γ. For now we need only note that rises in the
homestead exemption shift the ¯ θu
AH|A curve down until, when γ = z we have that
¯ θu
AH|A = 0, and guarantees would never be used, only secured loans.
602.4 Changes in homestead exemption
2.4.1 Motivation
The dataset The 1993 NSSBF was a survey of small business owners/managers
conducted under the auspices of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System and the Oﬃce of Small Business Administration.10 This survey covers a
representative sample of US nonﬁnancial, nonfarm, for-proﬁt businesses that have
fewer than 500 employees, and which were in operation as of December 1993.11
To ensure adequate representation across categories, the sample was stratiﬁed by
census region, urban and rural location and by employment size.12 There are ap-
proximately 1750 noncorporate ﬁrms and 2800 corporate ﬁrms in the sample, out
of a population of small business ﬁrms across the nation of about 7.5 million. In
Berkowitz and White (2004) this data is used, combined with their own data on
the homestead exemption level across states, to test how certain small business
loan variables (such as ‘credit rationing’, interest rate and loan size) varied with
diﬀerences in homestead exemption levels.
‘Homestead exemption’ refers to that part of a debtor’s assets which are im-
mune from creditors’ demands according to personal bankruptcy law. Depending
on the exemption level in any given state, the family home (or part thereof) is
exempt from forced sale during bankruptcy proceedings, legislation introduced
10Three such surveys (independently sampled ﬁve years apart) have been jointly conducted
by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and the Oﬃce of Small Business Administration (SBA):
1987, 1993 and 1998. Now called the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBA), details of all
three can be found at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss3/nssbftoc.htm.
11The actual surveying was conducted during 1994 and early 1995.
12See Cole and Wolken (1995) for a description of the dataset and the reasons underpinning
the survey decisions.
61for (family) welfare reasons. Diﬀerent states have diﬀerent levels of homestead
exemption, and these levels vary widely, ranging from no exemption in one state
(Maryland) to unlimited exemption in seven states (Arkansas, Florida, Iowa,
Kansas, Minnesota, Oklahoma and Texas).13 The median exemption level for
real estate is $15,000. All states also have personal property exemptions, ranging
from $1,200 (Montana) to $60,000 (Texas), with a median amount of $7,000.
The positive change in interest rates to increases in homestead ex-
emption The authors used as dependent variable the following three variables:
credit rationed, interest rate and loan size. The last two variables were direct
questions in the survey. The ﬁrst variable was inferable from the survey data
because small business owners were asked whether, in the three years preceding
the time of the survey, they had asked for credit, and whether, in the most recent
of these credit requests, they had received the loan. Owners had also been asked
whether they had not tried to seek a loan (even though they wanted one) during
the three years prior to the survey because they were discouraged about the like-
lihood of receiving one. ‘Credit rationed’ was then speciﬁed in the data as the
dummy variable ‘discouraged/denied’. The main independent variables of inter-
est were the homestead and personal exemptions by state, entered as their dollar
amounts and also as the square of their dollar amounts.14 The authors summa-
rize their ﬁndings about the relationship of these three variables to variations in
13The existence of an unlimited exemption in Florida is a reason why O J Simpson, in
anticipation of the civil law suit against him (which he eventually lost) by the family of victim
Nicole Simpson, transferred residence from California to that state. Note that Berkowitz and
White (2004) deﬁne ‘unlimited’ as the total amount of all the non-unlimited states’ exemption
amounts ($160,000), a separate dummy variable being included for those states which have
unlimited exemptions.
14Many other independent variables were included in the regression, derived from previous
papers using the same data set and showing them to be signiﬁcant explanators.
62homestead exemption as follows:
We ﬁnd that small businesses are more likely to be denied credit
if they are located in states with high rather than low homestead
exemptions and that, if they receive loans, the loans are smaller and
the interest rates are higher.15
These ﬁndings on the direction of the relationship of these three variables to
variations in homestead exemptions (positive in the ﬁrst and third cases, negative
in the second case) accorded with the simple supply and demand credit market
model exposited in their paper. More speciﬁcally, and focusing only on the ‘in-
terest rate’ variable, the probability of a ﬁrm being credit rationed conditional
on level of homestead exemption was calculated for both non-corporate and cor-
porate ﬁrms in the dataset.16 For non-corporate (corporate) ﬁrms located in a
state with both homestead and personal property exemption levels at the 25th
percentile, the predicted (if the homestead exemption level only rises, holding
constant the personal property exemption) probability increase in moving to the
50th percentile is 0.60 (0.27), and the increase if the homestead exemption rises
to the 75th percentile is 1.33 (0.56), and ﬁnally rises again from the 75th to the
‘unlimited’ percentile by another 0.22.17
15See Berkowitz and White (2004) at page 70.
16For this out-of-sample predictive exercise Berkowitz and White (2004) focused solely on
ﬁrms which were family-owned, non-minority owned, and which had average values for the
other right hand side variables of their regression equation.
17These ‘predicted probabilities’ are calculated by initially substituting the numerical
amounts of the 25th percentile for the homestead and personal property exemptions into the
regression equation already containing previously estimated coeﬃcients, calculating the value
of the dependent variable thereby obtained, and then (holding the numerical value of the per-
sonal property exemption ﬁxed) repeating the procedure with diﬀerent numerical values for the
homestead exemption.
63Non-monotonicity However, for both corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms,
this increase in predicted probability was not monotonic. In particular, for both
types of ﬁrm the change in predicted probability fell when the homestead ex-
emption level changed from the 75th percentile to somewhere in the 80th-90th
percentile range, before rises again for the ‘unlimited’ case. Furthermore, this
was true for the other two ﬁnancial variables considered in their paper, namely
‘credit rationing’ and ‘loan size’, suggesting not only that the non-monotonicity
is robust, but that there is something more fundamental at play here, since there
is clearly a connection among these diﬀerent variables and the underlying non-
monotonicities.
This was something the authors of Berkowitz and White (2004) were not
expecting and could not account for with their model. For the case of credit
rationing, they found that:
[T]he probability of credit rationing is not monotonically increas-
ing in the homestead exemption level. For noncorporates, for example,
the probability drops to 0.154 at the 90th percentile and then rises
to 0.161 if the homestead exemption is unlimited. We do not have a
good explanation for why the probability of credit rationing displays
this non-monotonic region when the homestead exemption level is not
unlimited.18
While for the case of interest rates they state:
For both ﬁrm types, however [ie, non-corporate and corporate], the
increase in interest rates is nonmonotonic when exemptions are around
18See Berkowitz and White (2004) at page 79.
64their 80th-90th percentiles. This result is surprising but consistent
with the credit-rationing results.19
2.4.2 Analysis
For the model in this paper, loan size and credit rationing cannot be analyzed.
Therefore, we focus only on the variation in interest rates (given variation in
homestead exemption level), where ﬁrm default risk (in this paper, the inverse
of θ) is used to proxy for the interest rate on the loan (since there is no explicit
interest rate in the model).
Once again the relevant equations are (2.8) and (2.9). We graph each indif-
ference curve in θ − γ space, ﬁnding slopes and turning points where necessary.
The case of ¯ θs
AH|A is easy to analyst. Since the security over the house is taken,











and so it can be seen that in θ − γ space is a horizontal line. For the case of
¯ θu
AH|Aon the other hand we have the following proposition.
Proposition 13. For the equation of ¯ θu











(z − γ)(α − λ)(1 − α)(1 − τE) + (z − γ)(1 − α)(1 − τE)[2r(1 − α) + 2z − γ]
{(1 − α)(1 − τE)[2r(1 − α) + 2z − γ]}2

19See Berkowitz and White (2004) at page 81.




z + [α − λ] + 2r(1 − α)
(1 − α)(1 − τE)
> 1 and limγ→∞ ¯ θu
AH|A =
(α − λ)
(1 − α)(1 − τE)
>
0
(v) θγ=0 < limγ→∞ ¯ θu
AH|A < θγ=γ∗
(vi) The graph of ¯ θu





   
γ=0







= −(1 − α)(1 − τE) < 0
(viii) The sign of
∂¯ θu
AH|A
∂γ is negative in the range [0,z] ∪ [γ∗,∞) and positive in
the range (z,γ∗)
Proof The various parts of the proposition are proved via basic algebra
and calculus. The details are omitted.
The easiest way to understand the relationship of ﬁrm default risk to home-
stead exemption is via ﬁgure 2.3. Recall that interest rates are the inverse of ﬁrm
default risk, so that the graph of interest rate with respect to γ requires ﬁgure
2.3 to be ﬂipped over. From which it follows that the variation is indeed positive
for most of the range, with an intermediate negative range. Thus the required
non-monotonicity arises automatically from the model of section 2.2.
2.5 Conclusion
Using an incomplete ﬁnancial contracting environment in the tradition of Aghion
and Bolton (1992) we have been able to outline the characteristics determining
whether a business loan is committed or not, and, if committed, whether it will
66Figure 2.3: Non-monotonic relationship between θ and γ for the indiﬀerence curve
¯ θu
AH|A.
be secured or not. It is shown that high-risk, small ﬁrms are more likely to be
required to commit a loan, and that the higher the homestead exemption level,
the greater the class of ﬁrms that are required to commit to their loans, to the
point that when the exemption level becomes very high, unsecured commitments
are unlikely to be used.
We have also been able to show that a straightforward model in the ‘in-
complete ﬁnancial contracting’ tradition can help explain an anomalous non-
monotonicity in small business ﬁnancing data ﬁrst noted in Berkowitz and White
(2004). In that paper it was shown that three small business ﬁnance variables
67(‘credit rationed’, interest rate and loan size) appeared to vary non-monotonically
when tested against the 1993 NSSBF survey data of small business ﬁnances, with
increases in state homestead exemptions to creditor claims under the Chapter 7
personal bankruptcy provisions of the US Bankruptcy Code.
An obvious empirical extension is to test the results of section 2.3 against
NSSBF data, while theoretical extensions include introducing multiple creditors
with the same or diﬀering claims (ie, priority diﬀerences), and introducing explic-
itly the transactional costliness of committed debt vis-a-viz uncommitted debt,
and, within the class of committed loans, the increased costliness of collateralized
vis-a-viz merely guaranteed loan, with a view to determining how the choice of
loan contract changes with changing homestead exemptions.
68CHAPTER 3
Marital Investments and Changing Divorce
Laws
3.1 Introduction
In 1969 California was the ﬁrst American state to introduce no-fault divorce.
Whereas previously an unhappy spouse required the consent of the other spouse
for marital dissolution, after the “no-fault revolution” divorce became unilateral.
Over the next decade California’s legislative reform was replicated across other
American states.1 The change in divorce law was followed by a short-run rise
in the divorce rate across the country.2 In the 1990s some southern states have
re-instituted a form of fault divorce and have given couples the option of choosing
which regime they would like to be regulated under. These changes in divorce law
gradually eﬀected behavior and social norms. The eﬀect of all these changes on
the welfare of spouses and ex spouses, as well as on children, is an on-going area of
research. Even if the divorce rate had not changed, a switch to unilateral divorce
involves a switch in intra-marital bargaining power from the spouse seeking to
maintain the relationship and the spouse wanting out. This redistribution of
1See Herbert (1988) for the history.
2See Wolfers (2005) for the empirics.
69power within marriages can raise intra-marital welfare by encouraging investment
in marital goods and discouraging the production of marital ‘bads’. As Stevenson
and Wolfers state in an article empirically exploring the eﬀect of unilateral divorce
on marital ‘bads’ like domestic violence and intimate homicide,“[I]n a society in
which people can leave abusive partners, spouses may be less likely to be abusive,”
(see Stevenson and Wolfers (2003) at page 2). In seeking to examine this question,
attention must also be paid to the fact of diﬀerent marital property law regimes
across the states of America.
Description of model This paper explores the tension in marriage between
exploiting investment opportunities versus the disamenity of remaining in the
marriage with a spouse of the ‘wrong’ type. The model consists of two voting
games played sequentially. In the ﬁrst the agents must decide whether to make an
investment and in the second whether to continue with the team (they are already
in) or whether to vote for dissolution. In both voting games, the voting rule can
be either majority or unanimous, giving a total of four possible ‘regimes’ for the
game as a whole, representing the diﬀerent combinations of marital property and
divorce laws that exist in the United States cross-sectionally and that existed in
the United States through time (see section 3.2 for a description of institutional
variance across the states). The investment voting game is a coordination game
with conﬂict - that is, each agent would prefer that the other agent made the
investment, though each also prefers that the investment goes ahead rather than
no. The decision to continue in the team or not is made by each agent on
the basis of his or her guess about the type of the other agent. In this paper
intra-team trust is modelled as uncertainty about the type of the person one is
playing the game with. In particular, each agent can be either ‘normal’ or else a
70‘disloyal’ type. A disloyal type is pre-programmed to play a certain way (as in
the reputational game theory literature). Normal types of agents only prefer to
stay in the team with another normal type and prefer to leave the team if with
a disloyal type. It is in this way that the decision to invest or not in the ﬁrm
voting game has a signalling aspect regarding one’s trustworthiness for the team
that is independent of the value of the investment project for whose exploitation
the team was established.
Description of results The paper focuses solely on symmetric equilibria
and shows that whenever there exists a symmetric equilibrium then it must be
separating. This is the equilibrium in which ‘loyal’ spouses invest and stay in
the relationship while ‘disloyal’ spouses do not invest and the marriage ends
in divorce. Under both types of marital property regimes, a no-fault divorce
regime is superior to a fault divorce regime in the sense that it expands the range
of parameters under which such an equilibrium exists. It is shown that, for a
given level of spousal ‘disloyalty’ (or divorce rate) within a society, intra-marital
welfare is higher under the communal (unilateral) than under the common law
(joint) marital property regimes. It is also shown that for societies with high
levels of spousal ‘disloyalty’ or divorce rates (such as modern, secular Western
countries), a unilateral marital property regime is preferable as a matter of policy
to a joint marital property regime, and that for societies with low levels of spousal
‘disloyalty’ or divorce rates (such as in developing and/or religious societies), this
policy preference is reversed.
Related literature Within the literature on ‘family economics’ intrafamil-
ial bargaining is modelled mostly as a cooperative game (with either ‘unitary’ or
71conﬂicting preferences - ‘consensus’ or ‘non-consensus’ - among the family mem-
bers: see the survey in Pollak and Lundberg (1996)). A brief summary of the
potentialities within that ﬁeld regarding those few exceptional papers which uti-
lize a non-cooperative bargaining environment can be found in Bergstrom (1997).
Within that small literature, the assumption of asymmetric information among
family members is virtually non-existent, as is any modelling of pre-play com-
munication. An article which brieﬂy touches on this issue is Peters (1986) who
states (at page 442, footnote 15):
The multi-period aspect of the marriage relationship may . . . reduce
incentives for strategic bargaining. The mistrust and ill-feelings en-
gendered by strategic bargaining can be detrimental to a relationship
based on trust and intimacy.’ [my emphasis]
There is a literature on ‘relational contracting’ (that is, self-enforcing repeated
game environments) within small teams (including marriages), which explores
the interrelationship between formal and informal enforcement mechanisms when
ease of relationship exit varies. See Lindsey et al. (2001) and Sobel (2002) for
examples.
Within the mechanism design literature Cramton et al. (1987) analyzes the
conditions for (ex post) eﬃcient partnership or marital dissolution where the
relationship asset or assets need to be divided, and where the division is obtained
via an auction mechanism closer to an all-pay auction than to the more traditional
auction formats found in practice. More elaborate mechanisms, when dealing
with a more general partnership dissolution environment than found in Cramton
et al. (1987) (such as, for example, non-independent valuations) are provided by
72McAfee (1992). A theory of joint asset ownership (such as in common law marital
property regimes) is provided by Cai (2003).
The model consists of two sequential voting games. The literature on se-
quential (or repeated) voting is sparse. Strategic voting such as is contained
in this paper began with Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and was extended by
Fedderson and Pesendorfer (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998). That
literature deals mostly with political elections and jury voting (some experimen-
tal support for strategic voting in a jury context can be found in Guarnaschelli
et al. (2000)). The introduction of communication to the (strategic) voting envi-
ronment is recent (see for example Gerardi and Yariv (2005)).
Finally, see Silbough (1998) and Scott and Scott (1998) for some legal aca-
demic perspectives of marriage, family law and divorce.
Outline of paper This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
relevant institutional context while section 3.3 outlines the model. Section 3.4
solves the model in pure strategies and section 3.5 outlines the main result for
communal property regimes. Section 3.6 discusses analogous results for common
law property regimes while section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The heterogeneity of family law regimes among the
states of America
Introduction The ability of marriages to exploit investment opportunities
depends on implicit team rules regarding who has the right to decide to undertake
the investment, and how the returns to that investment are shared within the
73team. These implicit rules (the intra-familial power balance) within the team are
in turn shaped and inﬂuenced by the explicit default rules provided by prevailing
family law regimes.
Marital property rights in the US depend on which legal tradition obtains in
the diﬀerent states. Legal traditions divide into two: the great families of the
common and civil law. Most English speaking countries are part of the common
law tradition stemming from England, and the same is true of the majority of
states in the US. However, owing to diﬀering historical trajectories, nine states are
part of the civil law tradition stemming from continental Europe. New York is an
example of a common law state and California (because of the Spanish/Mexican
heritage) an example of a civil law one.3
Both legal traditions had their own rules governing marriages. Consequently,
currently across the states of the United States there exists cross-sectional het-
erogeneity in marital property law regimes.
Marital property regimes Wealth within a marriage may be held either
jointly or separately. In this paper we deal only with jointly held wealth. In states
with community property this jointly held wealth is called (if certain conditions
are satisﬁed in its acquisition) community property.4 Legislative intervention
from the 1960s onwards in all community property states made both husband
and wife manager of the jointly-held community property (where previously just
the husband was deemed manager). While the details of each state’s legislation
diﬀer, generally speaking this management could be exercised concurrently or
3The nine community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin.
4On community property rules see generally Reppy and Samuel (2004).
74separately. In particular this means that a characteristic of community property
is that debt incurred by one managing spouse (if the purpose of the debt is for the
community) is potentially recoverable by creditors on any part of the community
property the debtor is entitled to manage, regardless of whether the other spouse
knew about the debts. However, with respect to community real property most
states have enacted additional legislation ensuring that both spouses are needed
for the purpose of entering a mortgage - thus the consent of the other spouse
is required prior to the encumbering of a community property such as a family
home by one or the other spouse.5 In this paper we deal only with real property.
In common law regimes there exist three main types of joint-ownership title:
joint tenancy, tenancy in common, and tenancy by the entirety. The form of title
which appears on its face to be closest to the civil law concept of community
property is the ‘tenancy by the entirety’. Unlike the other two types of title, but
similar to community property, it is a form of title which can only exist between
married couples, and only while the couple remains married. It involves the ﬁction
that husband and wife are one - hence each has a non-severable interest over the
entire property. Nonetheless, whether the rule governing consent by the other
spouse to incumber real property is the same or the opposite of that mentioned
above for community (real) property depends on which common law state we are
dealing with. It should be noted that not all common law states have the title of
tenancy by the entireties, and of those that do, they can be categorized into two
broad classes, namely those that do require consent (such as Pennsylvania), thus
making them akin to community property, and those that do not (such as New
5Torts, for example, can still be unilaterally incurred. On the legislative rules dealing with
encumbering real community property see Oldham (1993).
75York), thus making them akin to a joint or common tenancy.6
In both types of family law regime (civil or common law) wealth not held
jointly is held separately. Separately-held wealth obviously does not require the
consent of the other, non-owning spouse before it is capable of being encumbered.
On the other hand if the loan requires collateral of an amount greater than the
amount of separate wealth owned by the spouse seeking the loan, then of course
the consent of the other spouse, as owner of the other separate wealth upon which
the encumbrance is additionally sought, must be obtained. This would then be
a third-party guarantee.7 A similar logic applies to the tenancy in common.
Once again, in this paper we focus only on jointly-held (real) assets. The
governing example is the family home.
From the above brief discussion it can be seen that, and for the purposes of
summarizing, the only time consent is required in order to use a jointly-owned
(real) asset (since separate assets always require consent of the other owner to use
his asset) within marriage for the purpose of supporting an investment is when
the state is governed either by community property law or else is governed by
common law marital rules, and the tenancy is by the entireties (assuming that
type of title exists in the chosen state), and that the state is one in which the
rules for such a title developed in a way that consent was deemed required. States
which require consent for their titles by the entireties are: Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
6On the diﬀerent types of tenancy by the entireties across states see Phipps (1951), mention-
ing four categories, though in the intervening time since that article was written the categories
have collapsed to (broadly speaking) two.
7See more generally Harris et al. (1996). Rules of thumb for determining when a spouse
needs to co-sign or co-guarantee a loan are given in chapter 4 of Atkinson (2005), available at
(as of 05/15/2005) http://www.abanet.org/publiced/practical/books/family/home.html.
76Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming.8
All these diﬀerences in titles and legal traditions are schematized in ﬁgure 3.1,
where of course ‘C’ stands for ‘consent’ and ‘NC’ for ‘no consent’. The columns
represtent ‘civil law’ and ‘common law’ and the rows separate and joint property
titles. Since the focus of this paper is on joint asset ownership, the ‘C’ in the row
marked ‘separate’ represents the case when the other property is needed to back
a loan, that is, the case of third-party guarantees. Similar reasoning explains the
‘C’ in the box for the common law joint title ‘tenancy in common’.
Divorce regimes With respect to the law on divorce, by the 1980s most
states had implemented some form of no-fault divorce regime. Prior to that fault
had to be shown in order to leave a marriage. Some cross-state heterogeneity
has been introduced in the last twenty years through the agency of state-based
legislative intervention which attempted to give couples a choice of divorce regime,
though the take-up within those states which have provided such a possibility of
choice of stricter divorce rules has been low (see Silbough (1998) for a description
of developments).9
8States which do not are: Alaska, Arkansas, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon. As an
aside, the requirement of consent is also the rule in Great Britain as well as those of her former
colonies (such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand) which prefer to hew closely to legal
developments in Britain (see Fehlberg (1997)).
9Recently the state of Louisiana has legislated to oﬀer couples contemplating marriage a
menu of marital dissolution regimes, ranging from no-fault to fault to the impossibility of
divorce for any reason.
77Figure 3.1: Schematization of consent rules under diﬀerent legal traditions and
types of ownership title.
3.3 The model
3.3.1 Timing
At date 0 there are 2 agents who convene with the intention of establishing a
productive team relationship (marriage, partnership, joint venture and so on).
The process by which they come together (say via a matching model in the case
of marriage) is exogenous to the model. For convenience there is no intertem-
poral interest rate and no discount factors for the agents. Before date 1 the
agents privately learn their types and then at date 1 they make a (publicly ob-
servable) non-cooperative investment decision and then at date 2 they make a
78non-cooperative relationship decision (namely, whether to leave the relationship
or not). Whether the investment in fact goes ahead, and whether the relationship
in fact ends, depends on the type of legal/institutional regime prevailing (to be
described later). At the end of the game the return on the investment (if under-
taken) is realized and the agents’ types are also revealed and payoﬀs for the game
determined. The timeline for the model is depicted in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Timeline of game
3.3.2 Investment versus maintaining a relationship
The purpose of the paper is to explore the tension between exploiting an invest-
ment opportunity and maintaining a relationship under the two types of divorce
79law regimes. These two aspects of the model are outlined below. Regimes are
considered in the next subsection.
The investment decision At date 1 an investment opportunity presents
itself. The state of the investment is described by a random variable ˜ R with
support R = {0,1} and with γ the probability that 1 is realized. A realization of
zero indicates a bad outcome on the investment and a realization of one indicates a
good outcome on the investment. The speciﬁc payoﬀs arising from the investment
are detailed below.
The decision (at date 1) to invest or not is made simultaneously by both
agents. Investment is a binary decision for both agents, with at=1
j ∈ At=1
j = {i,ni}
(for j = 1 and 2), where i means an agent decides to invest and ni means an
agent decides not to invest. After the investment game, whether the project in
fact goes ahead depends on the property sub-regime in place. These sub-regimes
are outlined in subsection 3.3.3 below.
The relationship decision At date 2, the agents in the model (simultane-
ously) decide if they wish to remain in the relationship. This is a binary decision
for both agents, with at=2
j ∈ At=2
j = {c,l} (for j = 1 and 2), where c represents
the decision to continue with the relationship and l represents the decision to
leave. Whether the relationship ends or not depends on the exit sub-regime in
place. The exit sub-regime is outlined in subsection 3.3.3 below.
803.3.3 Institutional regimes
Relationships, and investments made within them, occur within pre-existing insti-
tutional regimes. For the purpose of this paper, these in turn can be decomposed
into two diﬀerent types of sub-regimes: one governing the sharing rules regarding
the joint relationship wealth (which we call the property sub-regime) and the
other governing the rules of dissolution of the relationship (which we call the
relationship sub-regime). Each subregime is a voting game. We consider these
two games and the sub-regimes that apply to them in turn.
3.3.3.1 Property subregime
At date 1 the simultaneous 2×2 investment game is played with possible outcomes
at=1 ∈ At=1 = {At=1
j }2. The investment goes ahead if either one of the two agents
voted for it (or both voted for it), that is, the investment regime is unilateral.
The set of outcomes of the date 1 subgame is denoted by ∆ = {I,NI} (where I





I if at=1 = {(i,i),(i,ni),(ni,i)}
NI if at=1 = {(ni,ni)}
Consider the example of marriage. At date 0 there exists a relationship asset
(say the family home) which (depending on the marital property law regime in
place) may either require consent for its use as collateral to back the investment
project or not. Clearly, given the heterogeneity across states described in section
3.2 above, the model constitutes a stylization of certain broad features discernable
amongst that institutional heterogeneity. In particular, it can be seen from the
explanation of marital property regimes given in section 3.2 that the unilateral
sub-regime which will be used throughout most of this paper is descriptive of
81common law joint tenancy and some states’ tenancy in the entireties. States in
the civil law tradition, as well as the eleven common law states mentioned towards
the end of section 3.2, namely, those where the tenancy by the entireties both
exists and also where that type of title requires the explicit consent of the other
spouse, are dealt with by the joint voting sub-regime of section 3.6 of the paper.
3.3.3.2 Relationship subregime
At date 2 another simultaneous 2 × 2 game is played, this time with outcomes
at=2 ∈ At=2 = {At=2
j }2. Whether the relationship continues or not depends on
whether the right to exit the relationship is unilateral, or else requires the con-
sent of both agents. Again, using marriage as an example, divorce laws (fault or
no-fault divorce) determine the ease of exit from a marriage. Deﬁne the set of
ultimate outcomes of the date 2 relationship game by ¯ ∆ = {C,E} (where C rep-
resents ‘continuing’ and E represents ‘ended’). Let the class of threshold voting
rules be parameterized by ω = 1,2. Under voting rule ω, the ﬁrst alternative is
chosen if and only if at least ω agents vote in favor of it. Given a voting rule ω
and a proﬁle of votes at=2, we let ψω (at=2) denote the group’s decision. Formally,





















It is straightforward to see that there are 4 types of game governing the
relationship as a whole. We deﬁne a regime (which governs the whole game) as
Γ(ω). We label the four possible types of regime as follows.
82Exit sub-regime
Unilateral (No-fault) Joint (Fault)
Property Joint Regime 1 Regime 3
sub-regime Unilateral Regime 2 Regime 4
Table 1: Classification of four regimes in the two−person case
3.3.4 The agents
All agents are risk neutral.
3.3.4.1 Types
We wish to model the possibility that deciding to invest or not invest involves a
consideration additional to that of whether the investment is likely to be a good
one or not, namely, that it can also be construed as a signal of an agent’s com-
mitment to the relationship. Hence we assume that each agent is (independently)
one of two possible types, with tj ∈ Tj = {N,D} (for j = 1 and 2), where N
denotes a normal type and D denotes a disloyal type. The probability of a draw
by nature resulting in agent j being type tj is given by ptj. Each agent’s type
is private knowledge throughout the relationship, and is only publicly revealed
at the end of the game. The agents learn what type they are before the date 1
investment decision is to be made.
Type D is a“reputational”type (in the sense of Fudenberg and Levine (1989)).
That is, it is always in type D’s interest to play a speciﬁed way independent of
the history of the game. The relationship per se is not important to the disloyal
type. By assumption then a disloyal type always chooses not to invest in the date
1 decision and always chooses to leave in the date 2 decision.
83It is therefore only the normal type who chooses which decision to make in
each period on the basis of the tension between the income side and the trust side
of the relationship. The speciﬁc payoﬀs of the normal agent are outlined below.
3.3.4.2 Payoﬀs
Each regime Γ(ω) deﬁnes the following Bayesian game GΓ(ω). Nature selects a
proﬁle of types according to the probability distribution p, then players learn
their types, after which they vote simultaneously at date 1 and again at date 2.
If the proﬁles of types and actions are t and (at=1,at=2), respectively, then (given







Since the disloyal-type agents are pre-programmed to play a speciﬁed way,
we need only specify the utility function of the normal types. Each normal
type agent’s utility possesses a wealth component and a relationship component.
These components are assumed separable. Speciﬁcally, each normal type agent’s
preferences are represented by the utility function u
Γ(ω)
j = wj(∆) + χj(¯ ∆,t). We
consider these two components in turn.
Wealth component Wealth is denoted by the wj term in each agent’s
utility function, so that (as required) agents are risk-neutral in wealth. If neither
agent votes in favor of investing then both agent receive zero. It costs c > 0
(where in addition c < r) for the investment to be undertaken. If it is undertaken
and the outcome is 0 (which can happen with probability 1−γ) then both agents
receive zero, and if it is undertaken and the outcome is 1 (which can happen
with probability 1−γ) then both agents receive r > 0 (it is a public good within
the team). In addition, whoever made the investment subtracts the cost from
84the amount she received. If they both voted in favor of investing then the cost
is shared equally between them. Clearly therefore either agent would prefer the
other to make the investment, but both would rather have investment than non-
investment as the aggregate outcome.
The payoﬀs from the t = 1 investment game can be summarized as fol-




Agent i (r − 1
2c,r − 1
2c) (r − c,r)
One ni (r,r − c) (0,0)











Agent i (γr − 1
2c,γr − 1
2c) (γr − c,γr)
One ni (γr,γr − c) (0,0)
85It is easily veriﬁed (given the assumption - without which investment would
never be undertaken - that γr−c > 0) that this stage game has two pure strategy
equilibria {(i,ni),(ni,i)} and one mixed strategy equilibrium.
Relationship component The relationship component of a normal-type
agent’s utility depends on two things: whether the agent is still in a relationship
or not (∆) and the types of the other agents in the group (T−j). Thus the
relationship component of the normal type’s utility takes the form χj(Tj,T−j,∆).
Of course, if Tj = D, then that type of agent’s payoﬀs are so conﬁgured as to
ensure that the predetermined (behavioral) strategy is played regardless of the
state of the relationship or the type of the other agent. Consequently, we need
only consider the case where Tj = N.
A normal-type agent shares a relationship with two possible types of other
agent: normal and disloyal. Although agents do not know the exact types of
the other agents with whom they share the relationship (at least until the end of
the game), their ultimate satisfaction from being in the relationship nonetheless
depends on the other agent’s type. Speciﬁcally, normal types prefer not to be in
a relationship with disloyal types and prefer to be in a relationship with normal
types. If we assume that agent j is a normal type, then the relationship compo-
nent of agent j’s utility function (conditional on being in a relationship or not)





0 if T−j = N
−δ if T−j = D





−δ if T−j = N
0 if T−j = D
if agent j is no longer in a relationship at the end of the game. Similarly for
the other agent in the team. Note that δ ∈ (0,∞).
3.3.5 Equilibrium
The solution concept used in this paper is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.10 As
usual, in order to deﬁne this concept we need to deﬁne the strategies, best re-
sponses and beliefs of the agents.
A pure (behavioral) strategy for an agent j is a pair of mappings bj =
(bt=1
j ,bt=2
j ). The ﬁrst mapping gives agent j’s date 1 decision conditional on
his or her type, bt=1
j : Tj 7−→ At=1
j . The second mapping gives agent j’s date
2 decision to remain in the relationship or not conditional on the (publicly ob-
servable) outcome of the date 1 investment game, thus bt=2
j : At=1 7−→ At=2
j . A
proﬁle of such pure strategies for the game is b = (b1,b2).
Mixed (behavioral) strategies are deﬁned in an analogous way. Thus ∆bt=1
j :




will be used to denote the probability that agent j plays at=1
j ∈ At=1
j in the date
1 investment game), and ∆bt=2




j ) will be used to denote the probability agent
j plays at=2
j ∈ At=2
j in the date 2 relationship game). The mixed (behavioral)
10For the above game, the set of Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria coincides with the set
of sequential equilibria of Kreps and Wilson (1982) (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for the
required conditions).
87strategy for agent j is thus the pair of mappings ∆bj = (∆bt=1
j ,∆bt=2
j ) and a
proﬁle of such mixed strategies for the game is ∆b = (∆b1,∆b2). Such a proﬁle
induces a probability measure over the set of histories of the game.
A mixed proﬁle for agent j, namely ∆bj = (∆bt=1
j ,∆bt=2
j ), is a best response
to mixed strategy of the other agent ∆b−j if it maximizes agent j’s expected
utility ∆bj = argmax∆bj uj(∆bj,∆b−j). A strategy proﬁle ∆b is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (BNE) if ∆bj is a best response to ∆b−j for j = 1,2. If it is further
required that out-of-equilibrium threats be credible, such as is required in Perfect
Bayesian Nash Equilibria, then the agents in the relationship are required to make
their decision whether to leave the relationship or not in the date 2 relationship
game optimally with respect to some beliefs that do not contradict the common
knowledge structure of the game. Let agent j’s beliefs about the type of the
other agent −j when the game has reached date 2 be deﬁned by the mapping
µj : T−j → [0,1]2.
Deﬁnition 1 (Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium). A strategy proﬁle ∆b
is a Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) if:
(i) (∆b1,∆b2) are mutual best responses; and
(ii) each agent j’s belief (µj) at date 2 about the type of the other agent is
determined via a Bayesian updating of j’s prior belief on the other agent’s
type, where the updating is taken with respect to the actions chosen by the
other agent at date 1.
In the rest of the paper we will conﬁne ourselves to ﬁnding symmetric equilib-
ria in pure (and mixed) strategies. Given the symmetry of the model, a solution
which focuses on symmetric equilibria is intuitively reasonable. Of course, the
88paper has nothing to say about the many asymmetric equilibria which also exist
in this model. We should also add that we do not consider equilibria in weakly
dominated strategies.
3.4 Solving the model
Symmetric pure strategy equilibria (if they exist) can be either separating and
pooling. We consider each category in turn.
3.4.1 Separating equilibrium
In this case loyal types play i at t = 1 and disloyal types (obviously) play ni at
t = 1. Note that on the equilibrium path each agent believes that the other agent
is loyal with probability one if she sees i played by the other agent at t = 1 and
otherwise loyal with probability zero if she sees ni played by the other agent at











Given these beliefs, at t = 2, a normal type of agent one will choose c when
µ1 = 1 and l when µ1 = 0.
In a unilateral relationship subregime the team continues only when both
agents are loyal and ends when either or both agents are disloyal. The expected




c] + (1 − pN)[γr − c]
In a joint relationship subregime the team also continues when it is comprised of
only loyal types and ends whenever one or both agents is a disloyal type. Once




c] + (1 − pN)[γr − c]
Note that, in a separating equilibrium, she is indiﬀerent between the two regimes.
We now check to see that agent one doesn’t seek to deviate at t = 1. Assume
that agent one deviates at t = 1 and plays ni instead. The investment still
occurs, but now agent one has free-ridden on agent two’s cost-bearing (if agent
two is normal). At t = 2 agent two believes that agent one is a disloyal type with
probability one and chooses to leave the relationship. In a unilateral relationship
subregime the relationship ends with certainty (both the normal and disloyal
types leave), leading to the following expected payoﬀ for agent one:
pN[γr − δ]









c − δ] ≤ [γr − c]




. When describing the payoﬀs for a normal agent one, one must include the fact that she could
be playing against either a normal or a disloyal agent two.








provided that δ < δ∗ where the superscript ‘nf’ indicates ‘no-fault’ and where
we have deﬁned δ∗ to be the value of the relationship disamenity such that δ∗ ≡
γr − 1
2c. (Note that when δ > δ∗ then p
nf
N is negative and the inequality is
reversed.)
In a joint relationship subregime, agent one (who believes agent two is normal
with probability one) still chooses to stay in the relationship. Agent one’s payoﬀ
then is
pN[γr]













where the superscript ‘f’ indicates ‘fault’. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 14 (Separating Equilibrium).
(i) A symmetric pure strategy separating equilibrium exists under both regimes
only if inequality 3.2 holds.
(ii) It is characterized by a normal type playing i at t = 1 and c at t = 2, with
updated t = 2 beliefs regarding the loyalty of the other agent as µj(i) = 1
and µj(ni) = 0 (for j = 1,2).
(iii) In both regimes, in a separating equilibrium the ﬁrst best eﬃciency is achieved.
Proof Proved in the text.
913.4.2 Pooling equilibrium
In this case loyal types play ni at t = 1 and disloyal types (obviously) play ni at
t = 1. Note that on the equilibrium path there is no investment undertaken at
t = 1. Also, on the equilibrium path each agent believes that the other agent is
loyal with prior probability pN if she sees ni played by the other agent at t = 1.
That is, in equilibrium, she is not able to use the t = 1 actions of the other agent
to distinguish between loyal and disloyal types to any greater extent than she
could before the investment subgame was played. Once again if we denote agent
one’s belief that agent two is loyal by µ1 then agent one’s equilibrium-path beliefs
are µ1 = pN. Agent one’s expected utility from playing c in the t = 2 subgame
of the unilateral subregime is
EU1(c) = pN[pNχ1(N,N|C) + (1 − pN)χ1(N,N|E)] + (1 − pN)[χ1(N,D|E)]
or
EU1(c) = −δpN(1 − pN)
and her expected utility from playing l in the second subgame is




EU1(c) − EU1(l) = −δpN(1 − pN) + δpN = δ(pN)
2 > 0
Hence, given her updated beliefs, agent one will play c in the relationship subgame
for any positive pN in the unilateral relationship subregime.
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of the joint subregime is
EU1(c) = pN[pNχ1(N,N|C) + (1 − pN)χ1(N,N|C)] + (1 − pN)[χ1(N,D|C)]
or
EU1(c) = −δ(1 − pN)
and her expected utility from playing l in the second subgame is
EU1(l) = pN[pNχ1(N,N|C) + (1 − pN)χ1(N,N|E)] + (1 − pN)[χ1(N,D|E)]
or
EU1(l) = −δpN(1 − pN)
Now
EU1(c) − EU1(l) = −δ(1 − pN) + δpN(1 − pN) = −δ(pN − 1)
2 < 0
Hence, given her updated beliefs, agent one will play l in the relationship subgame
for any pN in the joint relationship subregime.
On the equilibrium path therefore a normal type of agent one will receive in
expectation
−δpN(1 − pN)
in a no-fault divorce regime and she will receive
−δpN(1 − pN)
in a fault divorce regime. Note that, for a pooling equilibrium, she is indiﬀerent
between the two regimes.
93Given these beliefs and these t = 2 actions, we now check to ensure that
playing ni at t = 1 is a best response. Assume that agent one deviates at t = 1
and plays i instead. The investment now occurs. At t = 2 agent two believes that
agent one is a loyal type with probability one and so a normal agent two chooses
to stay in the relationship regardless of subregime. Agent one’s beliefs about
agent two are still the same as previously (namely, the prior pN), and so in the
joint relationship subregime agent one will leave and she receives in expectation
γr − c + pNχ1(N,N|C) + (1 − pN)χ1(N,D|E)
or
γr − c
while in a unilateral relationship subregime agent one will stay and so she
receives in expectation
γr − c + pNχ1(N,N|C) + (1 − pN)χ1(N,D|E)
or
γr − c
Under both regimes therefore investing strictly dominates not investing at t = 2,
and so we have the following proposition.
Proposition 15 (Uniqueness). If a symmetric equilibrium exists, it can only
be separating.
Proof The suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy sepa-
rating equilibrium for both regimes was shown in proposition 14 above. To show
uniqueness we need to show that there is no pooled and no (non-degenerate)
94mixed strategy symmetric equilibria. The non-existence of a pooled pure strat-
egy equilibrium was shown in the text above. This is true for all parameter
values. The non-existence of a non-degenerate mixed strategy symmetric equi-
librium follows from the fact that, in the second stage game, playing c weakly
dominates playing l for a normal type agent, so that the ﬁnal stage game has a
unique equilibrium in pure strategies, regardless of type of relationship regime,
and once equilibria in weakly dominated strategies are ruled out (as we do in this
paper). This statement is proved in Appendix B. Given that both agents of the
normal type will play c in the second stage game, in the ﬁrst subgame playing
i as a pure strategy weakly dominates any mix on i for a normal type and so
the only mixed strategy is the degenerate separating strategy found in subsection
3.4.1.
3.5 Main result
3.5.1 The superiority of no-fault divorce
In the t = 1 stage game played in isolation, both parties investing is not an
equilibrium. A long term relationship can lead to cooperative investing and cost
sharing. These are the separating equilibria shown in subsection 3.4.1. The
question of the paper is, which type of divorce regime is better from the point of
view of encouraging such cooperative, marital investments?
Proposition 16 (The Superiority of No-Fault Divorce). A no-fault divorce
regime expands the range of eﬃcient separating equilibria.




















2c) − δ](γr − 1
2c)
which is strictly positive whenever δ < δ∗ and zero when δ = 0. Since the range of





and 3.2), we have proved the proposition for δ < δ∗. For the case where δ > δ∗,
the inequality in equation 3.1 reverses and the magnitude of the RHS becomes
negative. This is true for the whole half-space.
Diagram 3.3 plots these respective (separating) equilibrium conditions in pN−
δ space. The region in vertical (green) lines is that part of pN − δ space where a
separating equilibrium exists for no-fault divorce rules but not for fault divorce
rules. The region in diagonal (blue) lines is that part of pN − δ space where a
separating equilibrium exists for both regimes, and the blank region is that part of
pN −δ space where neither dissolution regime possesses a separating equilibrium
(and we know from proposition 15 that no other type of symmetric equilibrium
exists in that subspace). It can be seen therefore that switching from a fault
to a no-fault divorce regime expands the space of eﬃcient marital investment
possibilities, as stated in proposition 16.
3.5.2 Trading oﬀ investment against relationship dis-amenity





































which is a downward-sloping straight line in r − δ space. In order to maintain
indiﬀerence between deviating from the equilibrium strategy or not, rises in the
dis-amenity of being in the relationship with the wrong type (δ) must be matched
by a lowering of the investment return (r). Taking the derivative with respect











97A lowering of the riskiness of the investment (rising γ) leads to a ﬂatter tradeoﬀ,
while a rise is the likelihood of being with a loyal type (rising pN) makes the
tradeoﬀ steeper. Note that there is no tradeoﬀ in the fault divorce regime.
3.6 Joint property subregimes
3.6.1 Separating versus pooling
Recall that the set of outcomes of the date 1 subgame is denoted by ∆ = {I,NI}






I if at=1 = {(i,i)}
NI if at=1 = {(i,ni),(ni,i),(ni,ni)}
3.6.1.1 Separating
When testing for t = 1 deviations in the separating equilibrium, after a deviation
the investment no longer occurs (unlike in the case of the unilateral property
subregime). Assume agent one deviates at t = 1. Then agent two (of a normal
type) believes that agent one is disloyal with probability one and chooses to leave
the relationship at t = 2. Agent one still believes that agent two is loyal and so
chooses to remain in the relationship at t = 2. In that case her payoﬀ is −pNδ in
the unilateral relationship subregime and zero in the joint relationship subregime.




c] − (1 − pN)c
(which reduces to pN(γr + 1
2c)−c), the equilibrium payoﬀ (the same across rela-
tionship regimes). The sign of pN(γr+ 1
2c)−c is ambiguous, depending on which
98part of parameter space the model is located in. There are three possibilities.
Proposition 17 (Existence).
(i) pN(γr+ 1
2c)−c > 0 : In this parameter range a separating equilibrium exists
for both types of divorce regimes.
(ii) 0 > pN(γr + 1
2c) − c > pNδ : In this parameter range there is a separating
equilibrium in the no-fault divorce regime but not in the fault divorce regime.
(iii) −pNδ > pN(γr + 1
2c) − c : In this parameter range neither divorce regime
possesses a separating equilibrium.
Proof The proof follows from comparing deviation and equilibrium payoﬀs
under each type of divorce regime.
3.6.1.2 Pooling
In the pooling equilibrium, deviating at t = 1 by making an investment does not
lead to investment occurring as it did in subsection 3.4.2. If agent one deviates,
agent two now knows that she is loyal with probability one and so agent two
(of a normal type) always chooses to stay in the t = 2 relationship subgame.
Agent one’s beliefs about agent two remain as previously, so that she always
leaves in the joint relationship regime and always stays in the unilateral rela-
tionship regime. Consequently, deviating gives her zero under both relationship
subregimes whereas in equilibrium she gets −δpN(1 − pN) (a negative number)
under both relationship subregimes. Hence deviating strictly dominates playing
the equilibrium pooling strategy under a joint property subregime, regardless of
divorce laws. The non-existence of a pooling equilibrium from proposition 15 still
holds.
99Proposition 18 (Uniqueness). If a symmetric equilibrium exists, it is separat-
ing.
Proof The above paragraph showed that a pooling equilibrium does not
exist for any parameter values. To show that a mixed symmetric equilibrium also
does not exist, we need to show that there is no non-degenerate mixed strategy
equilibrium. The proof is similar to that given in proposition 15 and once again
relies on ruling out equilibria in weakly dominated strategies. (See also Appendix
B.)
3.6.2 Comparison of property regimes
We are now ready to compare all four types of regimes. Conditional on type
of property subregime, in (separating) equilibrium, a normal agent obtains the
same payoﬀs in either divorce subregime. Hence we need only compare the two
diﬀerent types of property subregime (under a separating equilibrium). We have
EUunilateral − EUjoint = pN[γr −
1
2




= γr(1 − pN) > 0
Hence a unilateral property subregime pareto dominates (in equilibrium) a
joint property subregime. The intuition for this is obvious, since under a joint
property subregime, a normal type playing the equilibrium with a disloyal type
bears all the cost on her own without the beneﬁts of reward for eﬀort.
The equilibrium condition in the no-fault case is (conﬁning attention to the
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Notice in particular that the inequality is reversed and that the slope with respect
to δ is negative rather than positive.















Once again the p
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2c) + δ](γr + 1
2c)
< 0
So that in the case of a joint property subregime, as in the case under the uni-
lateral property subregime (though the reasoning is diﬀerent), a no-fault divorce
regime is better than a fault regime - better in the sense that the eﬃcient sepa-
rating equilibrium is possible for a larger range of parameters. Figure 3.4 is the
analogous diagram for the joint property case to ﬁgure 3.3. Once again, in the
ﬁgure the vertical (green) lines represent that part of parameter space in which a
separating equilibrium exists under the no fault divorce regime but not the fault
divorce regime, while the diagonal (blue) lines represent that part of parameter
101space were a separating equilibrium exists for both types of divorce regime. The
blank region is where there does not exist a separating equilibrium for either type
of divorce regime. From a comparison of diagrams 3.3 and 3.4 it can be seen that
a unilateral property subregime is better for low pN (a society with more disloyal
types: modern industrial societies, secular societies), and a joint property sub-
regime is better for higher pN (a society with fewer disloyal types: traditional
societies, religious societies).
Figure 3.4: Separating equilibrium under both divorce regimes in the joint prop-
erty case
1023.7 Conclusion
This paper explores the tradeoﬀ in marriages between investing in marital invest-
ment opportunities versus the dis-amenity of remaining in the marriage with a
disliked spouse. The paper uses a ﬁnite sequential voting model in which spouses
ﬁrst vote to invest and then vote to remain in the marriage. The paper focuses
solely on symmetric equilibria and shows that whenever there exists a symmet-
ric equilibrium it must be separating. This is the equilibrium in which ‘loyal’
spouses invest and stay in the relationship while ‘disloyal’ spouses do not invest
and the marriage ends in divorce. Under both types of marital property regimes
(unilateral or joint), a no-fault divorce regime is superior to a fault divorce regime
in the sense that it expands the range of parameters under which such an equi-
librium exists. It is shown that, for a given level of disloyalty (or divorce rate)
within a society, intra-marital welfare is higher under the unilateral than under
the joint marital property regimes. It is also shown that for societies with high
levels of spousal ‘disloyalty’ (or divorce rates), such as modern, secular Western
countries, a unilateral marital property regime is preferable as a matter of pol-
icy to a joint marital property regime, and that for societies with low levels of
spousal ‘disloyalty’ (or divorce rates), such as traditional, religious societies, this
policy preference is reversed and the joint marital property regime is superior.
Obviously any policy implications to be drawn from the model and conclusions
of this paper would need to made in the awareness of the stylized nature of the
distinction drawn between joint and unilateral property regimes, and how that
stylization compares when placed against the subtleties involved in the greater
cross-state and cross-title heterogeneity described in section 3.2 above.
103APPENDIX A
The generalized Nash bargaining of chapter 1
Let gi
E denote the share of ex post surplus obtained by the entrepreneur during
renegotiation (where i = A, H or AH). Correspondingly, let gi
B denote the share
of the ex post surplus obtained by the bank and gi
G the share of the ex post
surplus obtained by the guarantor. Obviously gi
E + gi
B + gi
G = Πi. We always
assume that the bank is exactly compensated for giving up its right to liquidate
asset i so that gi
B ≡ Li. Let the exogenous bargaining powers of the entrepreneur
and guarantor be τE and τG respectively, where τE + τG = 1. The generalized




















The ﬁrst order condition is
−
φ(1 − τE)













Thus the entrepreneur’s share of the ex post renegotiation surplus increases as
his power within the relationship increases.
104APPENDIX B
Mathematical proofs
B.1 Proofs for chapter 1
Proof of Proposition 1 (Contract Characterization)
(i) From P0 ≤ 0 in (1.5) we have either P0 = 0 or P0 < 0. Assume the latter.
This means that the bank (it cannot be the guarantor, who also has zero
(liquid) wealth) pays the entrepreneur something when R1 = 0. But then
it would be more socially eﬃcient (since foreclosing on either the project
or relationship asset is always ineﬃcient) to increase P0 and so reduce β0.
Hence P0 = 0.
(ii) For the cases of i = AH and A: From (1.6) we know that y0 ≥ 0. The amount
y0 is paid at date 2 when the entrepreneur pays P0 at date 1. Under the
assumption that the contractual terms are carried out as intended ex ante,
such a payment occurs only when R1 = 0. Under that scenario the assets
are foreclosed with probability β0 and not foreclosed with probability 1−β0.
In the former case y0 = 0 since there is no income from either date 1 or date
2 with which to make the payment. In the latter case date 2 income (r)
does accrue to the entrepreneur so that a positive payment is not infeasible,
but the assumption on the contracting technology made in subsection 1.2.1
105(namely, that the parties to the contract are constrained to stipulate the
same amount, y0, in both cases) means that the agents choose the lessor
amount when designing the contract at date 0. Hence y0 = 0. Note that
this last part of the proof only applies to the cases where the business asset
is secured. When it is not secured (as in the case of i = H) then even when
the (relationship) asset is foreclosed, the business asset still exists to provide
a date 2 return of r. The indicator function κi
r can be used to encapsulate
all three models in one term, as shown in part (ii) of the proposition.
(iii) Suppose to the contrary that βx is strictly positive at an optimum. Now
reduce βx by some inﬁnitesimal amount, say , without thereby changing
the bank’s and guarantor’s payoﬀs (this can be eﬀected if we simultaneously
ensure that Px is increased by Li in the bank’s payoﬀ and yx is decreased
by [κi
z(1 − SE)z − gi
G] in the guarantor’s payoﬀ). With these changes, the












E]. Hence, the assumption which began this
proof will be contradicted provided that [Li − κi





E] < 0. Note that gi
G + gi
E = Πi − Li. Incorporating this and
rearranging gives Πi−(κi
rr+κi
zz) which can easily be veriﬁed as negative for
each case of i. These changes therefore strictly increase the entrepreneur’s
payoﬀ while slackening the renegotiation constraint. Hence we have shown
the contradiction in the assumption that a strictly positive βx can be an
optimum.
(iv) The bank’s individual rationality constraint binds at an optimum since, if
it did not, it would be possible to decrease Px and consequently raise the
106entrepreneur’s payoﬀ. Such a change would not eﬀect the guarantor’s payoﬀ
and would slacken the renegotiation constraint.
The guarantor’s individual rationality constraint binds at an optimum since
if it did not, it would be possible to decrease yx and consequently raise the
entrepreneur’s payoﬀ. Such a change would not eﬀect the bank’s payoﬀ and
would slacken the renegotiation constraint.
(v) Suppose to the contrary that (1.4) is slack. We solve for the optimal contract
assuming this and show that the solution to this relaxed program violates
the renegotiation constraint. Using the results of parts (i)-(iv) of propo-
sition 1 the optimization problem (F(i)) can be reformulated as choosing
over [Px,β0,yx,y0] to maximize
θ[x − Px + r − yx + S
Ez] (B.1)
+ (1 − θ)[−y0(1 − κ
i
r) + (1 − β0κ
i





θPx + (1 − θ)β0L










x − Px + r − yx + S
Ez (B.4)
≥ x − y0(1 − κ
i
r) + (1 − β0κ
i






Px ≤ x (B.5)
1070 ≤ y0 ≤ r and 0 ≤ yx ≤ x + r − Px (B.6)
0 ≤ β0 ≤ 1 (B.7)
Ignoring the renegotiation constraint (B.4), we can substitute (B.3) and
(B.2) into (B.1) to obtain (after some manipulation and collecting the β0
terms) a reformulated objective function in terms of β0
θx − K + [r + S






This objective function is linear in β0 so we have a corner solution. The
feasibility constraint (B.7) on β0 means that the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ is
maximized when β0 = 0 because [κi
rr + κi
zz − Li] is positive for each of
the three cases of i (as is easily be veriﬁed). Consequently, from (B.2) and
(B.3), when β0 = 0 we have that Px =
K
θ
(which does not violate (B.5))




r). Returning now to the renegotiation
constraint (B.4), it can be rewritten as
























r) < 0 (B.8)
For the two cases of i = A and AH, κi
r = 1 and this provides the required
contradiction. For the case of i = H we have that κi








108which implies that K < (1−θ)y0 which gives the required contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Contractual Ineﬃciency) Using the results
of proposition 1 the optimization problem (F(i)) can be reformulated (as in the
proof of part (v) of proposition 1) as choosing over [Px,β0,yx,y0] to maximize
θ[x − Px + r − yx + S
Ez] (B.9)
+ (1 − θ)[−y0(1 − κ
i
r) + (1 − β0κ
i





θPx + (1 − θ)β0L












Px ≤ x (B.12)
0 ≤ y0 ≤ r and 0 ≤ yx ≤ x + r − Px (B.13)
0 ≤ β0 ≤ 1 (B.14)
We prove each part of the proof in turn.




















Substituting (B.15) and (B.16) into (B.9) gives (after manipulation) the
entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ from the contract
θx − K + (r + S






where the ﬁrst three terms are the net present value of the project in the
ﬁrst best case of no liquidation, while the last term is the expected eﬃciency
loss from the incompleteness of the contract, labeled ELi in the proposition.
This completes the proof of part (i) of the proposition.
(ii) The renegotiation constraint (B.12) can also be rewritten as a linear func-
tion of β0 to give
Px = y0(1 − κ
i








Substituting (B.15) and (B.16) into (B.18) gives (after manipulation) the
following reformulated renegotiation constraint
β0 =





E] + (1 − θ)[Li − κi
z(1 − SE)z]
(B.19)
The new linear program is to choose β0 and y0 to maximize (B.17) subject
to (B.19) and (B.14). There are two cases. In the ﬁrst case, when i = AH
or A, κi
r = 1 and so the program is equivalent to choosing the minimum β0
compatible with (B.17) and (B.14). In the second case when i = H, κi
r = 0
and so any positive y0 is a possible solution. The y0 which minimizes β0 is
y0 = r (the maximum possible y0 in its range). In either case (B.19) is the
solution provided that it falls between zero and one, which proves part (ii)
of the proposition.
110Proof of Proposition 5 (Risk Proﬁle: Comparing Assets A and H)
Taking the derivative of (1.11) with respect to θ we get
K[1 − α]{1 − λ − τE(1 − 2λ)} − {K − r}[1 − λ]{1 − α − τE(1 − 2α)} > 0
so that when K < r we have that ∆ELA
H is increasing in θ for all values of θ. It
follows that the entrepreneur secures the project asset when θ < ˜ θA|H and secures
the relationship asset when θ > ˜ θA|H.
Proof of Proposition 6 We prove only part (i). Part (ii) is proved via
basic calculus. The sign of the derivative of ˜ θA|H (with respect to r) depends on
the sign of the numerator, or more speciﬁcally depends on the sign of
K(1 − α)(S
E − τE(1 − 2λ)) − (K − r)(1 − λ)(1 − 2α)(1 − τE)
which is positive owing to the assumptions in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 7 (Risk Proﬁle for Pure Personal Asset Case)
(i) θX is obtained via manipulation of the denominator of (1.10) after substi-
tuting in the relevant parameters. This modiﬁed version of equation (1.10)
is then set equal to zero and the θ terms gathered on the LHS. Since (1.10)
must be positive, the sign of the denominator of (1.10) will depend on the
sign of the numerator (which case we are dealing with - K greater than or
less than r). This gives the two cases mentioned in the proposition.
(ii) The case of K > r involves comparison of θ∗ and θX. Since it is not rational
for the entrepreneur to invest whenever θ < θ∗, feasible investments are only
prevented when θ∗ < θX. For the case of K < r we have that θ∗ can’t be
111negative (which it will be when K < r) and so must instead be at its lower
limit, namely θ∗ = 0. Thus all projects are ex ante viable and so from part
(i) of the proposition, [θX,1] must be the non-empty set of unfundable risk
proﬁles. For the ﬁnal statement we need the equivalent of (1.10) for the





θr[1 − τE(1 − 2α)] + (1 − θ)αr
and it is easily veriﬁable that both the numerator and the denominator are
always positive.
(iii) We examine each case in turn.




1 − λ − τE(1 − 2λ)
which is everywhere negative by the fact that the denominator of θX
is positive. Hence θX is decreasing in SE.




τE(2SE − 1) − SE
[1 − λ − τE(1 − 2λ)]2
The denominator is obviously positive so that the sign depends only
on the numerator which is always negative and so θX is decreasing in
λ.




(1 − SE − λ)(1 − 2λ)
[1 − λ − τE(1 − 2λ)]2
Since by fact or assumption the other terms are positive, the sign of
the derivative depends on (1 − 2λ). This gives λ = 1
2 as the cut-oﬀ
and accordingly gives the step function of the proposition.
112B.2 Proof that the relationship stage game of chapter 3
has a unique (stage game) equilibrium when equilib-
ria in weakly dominated strategies are ruled out
Proof To show that the ﬁnal stage game has a unique equilibrium if we are
willing to rule out equilibria in weakly dominated strategies, recall that at the
beginning of the t = 2 subgame the space of t = 1 histories (that is, At=1) can be









m ≡ Pr(loyal2|m = at=1) be agent one’s belief at t = 2 given that
the outcome of the t = 1 investment game is m. For m = {(ni,i),(i,i)} we have
that µ1
m = 1, since a disloyal type does not mix and so i cannot be the outcome
of a randomized strategy for that type. In those cases agent one (of a normal
type) will strictly prefer play c in the second stage game. Hence we need only
deﬁne agent one’s beliefs for the two cases of m = {(ni,ni),(i,ni)}:
113Agent Two




pN(1−p2)+(1−pN)1 1 − µ1
m
where pj is the probability that agent j invests in the t = 1 investment sub-
game. In a mixed strategy equilibrium we have the following
EU1(c) = EU1(l)
where the upper bar indicates that the expected utililities are with respect to the
second subgame payoﬀs only.
(i) Unilateral relationship regime:
We have four cases to consider. The D case is the simplest. Both agents
believe that the other is a loyal type with probability one, and hence they both
(when of the normal type) play c, and otherwise l. So the relationship continues
iﬀ they are both normal and ceases iﬀ they are both disloyal. The cases of B and
C are symmetric, so we need only consider one. We consider case B. In this case
µ2
B = 1 and µ1
B =
pN(1−p2)
pN(1−p2)+(1−pN)1. Player two, given his beliefs, plays c (if he is
a normal type). Player one is indiﬀerent between playing c or l if
µ
1











which is a contradiciton and hence agent one always prefers to play c. Once again
the relationship continues iﬀ both agents are loyal and ends iﬀ both agents are
disloyal. We are left with the A case, in which both agents have non-degenerate
114beliefs of µ
j
A for j = 1,2, and in which a mixed equilibrium can be supported.
Hence in three out of the four classiﬁcations of the history a normal agent strictly
prefers to play c, while in the remaining one he is at best indiﬀerent.
(ii) Joint relationship regime:
The existence of the joint relationship subregime instead of the unilateral
relationship subregime makes unilateral deviations a matter of indiﬀerence for the
agent deviating rather than, as before, being strictly dominated. The additional
equilibria thereby created are ruled out since they are all in weakly dominated
strategies.
115APPENDIX C
Figures for chapter 1
Figure C.1: Source Petersen and Rajan (1994). 1987 NSSBF.
116Figure C.2: Source Avery et al. (1998). 1987 and 1993 NSSBF. 1993 dollars.
117Figure C.3: The pattern of collateralized asset choice in risk-growth space, for
K = $50,000.
118Figure C.4: Source: Hurst and Lusardi (2004) Table A1, 1987 NSSBF, 1996
dollars
119Figure C.5: Diagram depicting proposition 7 in section 1.5.
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